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Abstract
In this paper, I show that political opposition to immigration can arise even when
immigrants bring signicant economic prosperity to receiving areas. I exploit exoge-
nous variation in European immigration to US cities between 1910 and 1930 induced
by World War I and the Immigration Acts of the 1920s, and instrument immigrants
location decision relying on pre-existing settlement patterns. Immigration increased
natives employment and occupational standing, and fostered industrial production
and capital utilization. However, despite these economic benets, it triggered hostile
political reactions, such as the election of more conservative legislators, higher support
for anti-immigration legislation, and lower public goods provision. Stitching the eco-
nomic and the political results together, I provide evidence that nativesbacklash was,
at least in part, due to cultural di¤erences between immigrants and natives, suggesting
that diversity might be economically benecial but politically hard to manage.
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1 Introduction
The recent migration waves to Europe and the US have generated a heated political de-
bate. Support for right-wing, populist parties is increasing, and proposals to introduce or
tighten immigration restrictions are becoming more and more common. The mounting anti-
immigration rhetoric rests on two grounds one economic and one cultural. First, immigrants
are blamed for increasing labor market competition and reducing nativesemployment. Re-
cently, some prominent scholars have pushed this argument one step further, suggesting that
the deteriorating quality of immigrants may slow down productivity in receiving countries
(Collier, 2013; Borjas, 2016). Second, immigrantscultural diversity is viewed as a major
obstacle to their assimilation, and is often perceived as a threat to the values and the social
cohesion of receiving countries (see, for instance, the discussion in Baker et al., 2015, and in
Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017).
In American history, this is not the rst time that immigration is such a relevant and
controversial issue. Between 1850 and 1915, during the Age of Mass Migration, more than
30 million people moved from Europe to the United States (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017),
and the share of immigrants in the US population was even higher than it is today (Figure
1).1 Also at that time, anti-immigration sentiments were widespread, and the introduction of
immigration restrictions was advocated on both economic and cultural grounds. After 1915,
World War I and the Immigration Acts (1921 and 1924) put an end to the Age of Mass
Migration, and, crucially, a¤ected migration ows from di¤erent sending regions to di¤erent
degrees. Since immigrants tend to cluster along ethnic lines (Card, 2001), the di¤erential
e¤ect of these shocks across European countries generated signicant variation in the number
as well as in the mix of immigrants received by US cities over time.
Leveraging this variation, I investigate the economic and political e¤ects of immigration
across US cities between 1910 and 1930, and study whether political discontent reects or
runs counter to the economic consequences of immigration. The key econometric challenge
to my analysis is that immigrantslocation decision might not be random. On the one hand,
immigrants may have moved to places with better employment opportunities and with more
appealing tax-public spending bundles. On the other, they could have settled in otherwise
declining cities which had lower house prices.
To overcome these and similar concerns, I construct a "leave-out" version of the shift-
share instrument commonly adopted in the literature (Card, 2001). The shift-share instru-
ment rests on the empirical regularity that immigrants cluster geographically in receiving
countries, and newcomers tend to settle where their ethnic community is larger, due to family
1The total number of foreign-born residents is, however, higher today. Also, contemporary immigration
is underestimated because of the presence of large numbers of undocumented immigrants (see the dashed
line in Figure 1 and Borjas, 2016).
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ties and social networks, and not because of local economic conditions (Stuart and Taylor,
2016). Starting from this observation, I predict the number of immigrants received by US
cities over time by interacting 1900 settlements with subsequent migration ows from each
sending region, net of the individuals that eventually settled in a given citys metropolitan
statistical area (MSA).2
The validity of this instrument hinges on one critical assumption: the city-specic char-
acteristics that attracted early movers from any given ethnic group must not be a¤ecting
the evolution of local economic and political conditions in subsequent decades (see also
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018). To assess the validity of the instrument, I perform several
checks - including testing for pre-trends, interacting year dummies with pre-migration city
characteristics, and separately controlling for (predicted) measures of industrialization. I also
deal with the concern that aggregate migration ows (by ethnic group) may be endogenous
to local economic conditions in US cities using two alternative strategies.
First, I replace actual migration ows (from each sending region) with variation solely
induced by World War I and the Immigration Acts. A particularly appealing feature of
these shocks is that they dramatically and unexpectedly altered both the number and the
composition of immigrants. In turn, this greatly reduced the serial correlation in migration
ows to US cities - a potential threat to the validity of shift-share instruments constructed
using post-1965 data (Jaeger et al., 2018). Second, similarly to Sequeira et al. (2017), in
the online appendix, I construct a measure of predicted immigration determined uniquely
by temperature and precipitation shocks in origin countries. In both cases, my ndings are
unchanged.
I nd that immigration had a positive and signicant e¤ect on nativesemployment as well
as on their occupational standing. My estimates suggest that, for every ten new immigrants,
two more natives found a job. Since no comprehensive data on wages is available for this
period, as commonly done in the literature (e.g. Abramitzky et al., 2012, 2014), I proxy
for nativesincome using (log) occupational scores.3 Consistent with immigrants improving
nativesoccupational mobility, I nd a large and positive e¤ect of immigration on natives
occupational scores. Moreover, using data digitized from the Census of Manufactures, I show
that, even in a heavily exposed sector like manufacturing, there was no signicant reduction in
wages.4 These results were made possible by two mechanisms. First, immigration increased
2In my baseline specication, I consider only immigration from Europe (see online appendix Table A1),
but results are robust to extending the analysis to all other non-European countries (see online appendix
Section A4.5).
3As discussed below, occupational scores assign to an individual the median income of his job category
in 1950, and can thus be used as a proxy for lifetime earnings (Abramitzky et al., 2014).
4Wage data, digitized from the Census of Manufactures, do not distinguish between immigrants and
natives. Since new immigrants were closer substitutes for previously arrived immigrants than for natives,
these results should be interpreted as a lower bound for the negative e¤ect (if any) of immigration on natives
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rmsinvestment and productivity, generating an outward shift in labor demand. Second,
because of complementarity, natives moved away from occupations that were more exposed
to immigrantscompetition and specialized in jobs where they had a comparative advantage
and, because of discrimination, immigrants did not have access to. In online appendix B, I
present a simple model of directed technical change that captures both capital adjustments
and nativesoccupational upgrading, and that can explain my empirical results.
However, despite these positive economic e¤ects, immigrants triggered widespread and
hostile political reactions. First, cities cut public spending and taxes in response to im-
migration. The reduction in tax revenues was entirely driven by declining tax rates, while
the fall in public goods provision was concentrated in categories where either inter-ethnic
interactions are likely to be more salient (e.g. education) or poorer immigrants would get
larger implicit transfers (e.g. sewerage, garbage collection). Second, immigration reduced
the pro-immigrant partys (i.e., Democrats) vote share, and was associated with the election
of more conservative representatives. Third, members of the House representing cities more
exposed to immigration were signicantly more likely to support the National Origins Act
of 1924, which put an end to the era of unrestricted immigration to the US, and governed
American immigration policy until 1965.
In the last part of the paper, stitching together the economic and the political e¤ects
of immigration, I show that political discontent was increasing in the cultural distance be-
tween immigrants and natives, suggesting that backlash had, at least in part, non-economic
foundations.5 These ndings are consistent with a long-standing idea in the literature that
diversity can be economically benecial because of gains from specialization and complemen-
tarity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina et al., 2016), but may be politically hard to
manage, resulting in lower preferences for redistribution (Dahlberg et al., 2012), more limited
public spending (Alesina et al., 1999), and higher conict (Bazzi and Gudgeon, 2016).6
My work is related to the vast immigration literature. First, many papers have studied
how immigration a¤ects nativeslabor market outcomes.7 My results are in contrast with
the negative e¤ects estimated by Borjas (2003) and Dustmann et al. (2017) among others,
and somewhat di¤erent from the zero e¤ect found by several cross-city studies for the con-
temporary period (e.g. Card, 2001 and Card, 2005). At the same time, the idea that, under
certain conditions, immigration can benet natives through rmsinvestment and technol-
earnings.
5I proxy for cultural diversity with religion and linguistic distance. The use of religion is motivated by
the historical evidence that, at that time, nativism often resulted in anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism -
to the point that the revival of the KKK in the 1920s rested on an openly anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic
rhetoric (e.g. Higham, 1955).
6Nekby and Pettersson-Lidbom (2017) revisit the work by Dahlberg et al. (2012), and argue that ndings
in the latter paper might be sensitive to the sample used and to measurement of preferences for redistribution.
7See Lewis and Peri (2015) for a recent review.
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ogy adoption on the one hand, and through complementarities and gains from specialization
on the other is consistent with ndings in Clemens et al. (2017), Lafortune et al. (2016), and
Lewis (2011), and Peri and Sparber (2009) and Foged and Peri (2016) respectively. Second,
a growing set of studies has investigated the e¤ects of immigration on electoral outcomes in
receiving countries (Barone et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2016; Halla et al., 2017).8
The main contribution of my paper is to analyze jointly the economic and political
impact of an episode of mass migration in a unied empirical framework. Exploiting the
largest wave of immigration in American history, I document that political discontent can
arise even when immigrants bring di¤used economic prosperity to natives, suggesting that
cultural considerations are likely to be as important as economic ones in shaping natives
reactions (see also Card et al., 2012, and Sniderman et al., 2004). I further complement the
political economy literature by studying the e¤ects of immigration on key policy variables,
such as tax rates and public spending outcomes for which, as noted in Card (2009) and
Borjas (2016) among others, despite the large debate on the consequences of immigration,
little is known.9
Finally, my work is related to the recent and growing literature on the Age of Mass
Migration.10 Abramitzky et al. (2012, 2014, 2018) study the selection and the assimilation
of European immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration, while Ager and Hansen (2017),
Lafortune et al. (2016), and Sequeira et al. (2017) investigate their impact on contempora-
neous and long-run economic development. Closest to my work is the paper by Ager and
Hansen (2017), who, consistently with my results, document that the Immigration Acts
slowed down economic activity and industrialization across US counties and cities. I com-
plement this paper by jointly analyzing the economic and the political e¤ects of immigration
in this historical context, and by studying the determinants of one of the most dramatic
changes in American immigration policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical back-
ground. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy, constructs
the instrument for immigration, and presents rst stage results. Section 5 investigates the
e¤ects of immigration on nativesemployment and on economic activity. Section 6 studies
how immigrants a¤ected tax revenues, public spending, electoral outcomes, and congress-
men ideology as well as their voting behavior on the 1924 National Origins Act. Section 7
shows that the political e¤ects of immigration depended on the cultural distance between
8See also Mayda et al. (2016) for a recent review.
9In a companion paper (Tabellini, 2017), I study how the migration of southern born African Americans
a¤ected public goods provision and government nances in northern cities during the rst wave of the Great
Migration.
10Goldin (1994) is an early and seminal contribution on the poliltical economy determinants of the intro-
duction of the Immigration Acts.
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immigrants and natives and on immigrantsethnic diversity. Section 8 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 The Age of Mass Migration
Between 1850 and 1915, more than 30 million people moved from Europe to the US. Until
1890, most immigrants came from the British Isles, Germany, and Scandinavia, but, from
the late 1880s, immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe increased steadily, as the
costs of migration fell with the advent of steam technology (Keeling, 1999). In 1870, al-
most 90% of the foreign born came from Northern and Western Europe, whereas less than
5% of immigrants had arrived from Southern and Eastern Europe (Figure 2). By 1920,
however, the situation had changed dramatically, with the share of migrant stock from new
source countries being as high as 40%. Europeans from new regions were culturally farther
from natives and signicantly less skilled than those from old sending regions (Hatton and
Williamson, 1998, 2006). For instance, while literacy rates of immigrants that entered the
US between 1900 and 1910 were very close to one for all old sending countries, they were
signicantly lower for new source regions (online appendix Figures A1 and A2).
The shift in the composition of immigrants and concerns over their assimilation induced
Congress to establish a commission that, between 1907 and 1911, studied the economic
and social conditions of immigrants (Higham, 1955). In 1911, the Immigration Commission
recommended the introduction of immigration restrictions, and in 1917, after decades of
heated political debate, Congress passed a literacy test requiring that all immigrants entering
the United States had to be able to read and write (Goldin, 1994).
Even before the adoption of the literacy test, in 1914, the Age of Mass Migration came
to an abrupt end due to the onset of World War I, which drastically reduced European
immigration between 1915 and 1919 (Figure 3). In 1920, despite the literacy test, migration
ows increased again to their 1910 levels, fueling nativist movements and generating even
stronger political pressure to adopt more e¤ective measures to curb immigration. Figure A3
plots trends of migration ows (right axis) and of the number of articles in local newspapers
referring to immigration (left axis) over time, and shows that both fell dramatically during
WWI, but then increased again once the war was over. In response to the growing demand
for immigration restrictions, in 1921 and 1924 Congress nally passed the Immigration Acts
to limit the number of immigrants that could enter the United States in a given year by
introducing country-specic quotas based on 1890 immigrantspopulation.11
11With the 1924 National Origins Act, the total number of immigrants that could be admitted in a given
year was capped at 150,000. In 1921, quotas were specied reecting the 1910 composition of immigrants.
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Both World War I and the Immigration Acts a¤ected di¤erent sending countries in dif-
ferent ways. In particular, quotas were set so as to limit the inow of immigrants from
new sending regions, while favoring that from old sources such as the UK, Germany, and
Scandinavia. Figure A4 shows the changing composition of immigrants entering the United
States during the previous decade between 1900 and 1930. Until 1920, the majority of recent
immigrants came from Eastern and Southern Europe, but this trend was abruptly reversed
in the 1920-1930 decade, when the share of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian immigrants in-
creased as a result of the Immigration Acts. Since immigrants tend to cluster along ethnic
lines (Card, 2001), the post-1915 events generated substantial variation in the number as
well as in the mix of immigrants received by US cities over time (Figures A5 and A6). This
is the variation I exploit in my empirical analysis.
2.2 Immigrants and the US Economy
Historical accounts tend to view immigrants as one of the key determinants of American
industrialization and economic development during the Age of Mass Migration. When de-
scribing the economic impact of European immigrants, historian Maldwyn Jones wrote that
"The realization of Americas vast economic potential has...been due in signicant measure
to the e¤orts of immigrants. They supplied much of the labor and technical skill needed to
tap the underdeveloped resources of a virgin continent" (Jones, 1992, pp. 309-310). Sim-
ilarly, John F. Kennedy argued that "every aspect of the American economy has proted
from the contribution of immigrants" (Kennedy, 1964, p. 88).
During the Age of Mass Migration, the US economy had large potentials for growth.
Economic historians argue that, in this context, immigrants provided a cheap and unskilled
supply of labor which could not only be absorbed, but that may have even allowed industries
to expand (Foerster, 1924), in turn creating new job opportunities for native workers. Even
though some studies have found a negative e¤ect of immigrants on wages (Goldin, 1994),
labor shortage was a recurring theme in this historical period.12 For instance, in a 1906
article, the New York Times was reporting that "Need of labor is the universal cry. Demand
in all parts of the country is greater than supply. Not enough immigrants. Statements from
agents show that men are scarce in all the States".
Moreover, since immigrants, especially from Eastern and Southern Europe, were unskilled
and had low levels of English prociency, they may have benetted natives because of com-
plementarity and gains from diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Foged and Peri, 2016).
Along these lines, in his 1971 The Transformation of the American Economy, economic his-
However, they were rapidly changed to 1890 to limit immigration from new sending countries even further
(Goldin, 1994).
12Due to data limitation, Goldin (1994) could not distinguish earnings of immigrants from those of natives.
6
torian Robert Higgs argues that "the rapid pace of industrial expansion has increased the
number of skilled and supervisory positions so fast that practically all the English speaking
employees have had the opportunity to rise on the scale of occupations" (Higgs, 1971, p.
420).
2.3 Immigration and NativesBacklash
Despite the positive views on the contribution of immigrants to the American economy
expressed by economic historians, Europeans, especially from new sending countries, faced
strong political opposition. Nativesbacklash culminated in the passage of the literacy test of
1917 and, more importantly, of the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, which were explicitly
introduced to shut down immigration from "undesirable sources". Goldin (1994) argues that
concerns about unemployment and labor market competition were the main motivation for
the immigration restrictions of the 1920s. Undoubtedly, the coincidence of large immigration
ows with the severe macroeconomic recessions of 1907, 1913-1914, and 1919 increased the
perception among native workers that immigrants were threatening American standards of
living.
However, while economic considerations certainly played a role, anti-immigration senti-
ments tended to have deep cultural roots (Higham, 1955; Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017).
This idea is very e¤ectively summarized in a 1921 statement by Irving Fisher, who argued
that "If we could leave out of account the question of race and eugenics...I should, as an
economist, be inclined to the view that unrestricted immigration...is economically advanta-
geous...the core of the problem of immigration is...one of race and eugenics" (Leonard, 2005).
On a similar vein, in 1896, the rst president of the American Economic Association, Fran-
cis A. Walker, claimed that the American standard of living and the quality of American
citizenship had to be protected "from degradation through the tumultuous access of vast
throngs of ignorant and brutalized peasantry from the countries of Eastern and Southern
Europe" (Greenwood and Ward, 2015).13
Anti-immigration sentiments were most often directed towards two groups. First, Jews
and Catholics, whose values were perceived as being di¤erent from the Puritan tradition
prevailing in the US at that time.14 Second, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Eu-
rope, who were culturally and linguistically distant from natives and, because of their lower
13Consistent with this qualitative evidence, DAmico and Tabellini (2017) nd that immigration induced
local newspapers to adopt more racist terms when referring to immigrants, especially from Eastern and
Southern Europe.
14Around the time of World War I, Jews were deemed responsible for promoting the war in order to make
prots out of it. For example, in 1915 Henry Ford claimed he knew "who caused the war: German-Jewish
bankers" (Watts, 2009, p. 383). During the Red Scare, and in the inter-war period more generally, Jews
were often blamed for being at the origin of Bolshevism and the worldwide di¤usion of Communism.
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socio-economic status, were regarded as belonging to inferior races. Countless statements by
politicians and newspapers articles provide examples of how Eastern and Southern European
immigrants were perceived at the time. For instance, in 1916, congressman Thomas Aber-
crombie claimed that "The color of thousands of them [i.e. the new immigrants: Mediter-
raneans, Slavs, Jews] di¤ers materially from that of the Anglo-Saxons" (Higham, 1955),
while the editor of the Saturday Evening Post, Kenneth Roberts, in a 1920 article wrote that
"if a few more million members of the Alpine, Mediterranean and Semitic races are poured
among us, the result must inevitably be a hybrid race of people as worthless and futile as
the good-for-nothing mongrels of Central America and Southeastern Europe".15
3 Data
My analysis relies on a balanced panel of 180 US cities for the three Census years 1910,
1920, and 1930. The sample includes all cities with at least 30,000 residents in each of the
three censuses, and where at least some Europeans were living in 1900 (see Figure A7 and
Table A2 for the complete list of cities). I restrict the attention to cities with at least 30,000
residents because below this population threshold data on public spending and government
nances, two of the key outcomes of my paper, were not reported. To study the economic
and political e¤ects of immigration, I combine data from several sources.
Immigration and city population. Data on city population and on the number of
immigrants by country of origin at the city and at the national level were taken from the
decennial US Census of Population, made available by IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2015).16 For
1900, I use the 5% sample, while for 1910, 1920, and 1930, I rely on the full count census
datasets.
Nativeslabor market outcomes. Restricting the sample to native men in working
age, I compiled data on employment, literacy, and occupation from the US Census of Popu-
lation.17 Since until 1940 wage data are not available, I proxy for nativesincome using (log)
occupational scores, as commonly done in the literature (e.g. Abramitzky et al., 2012 and
Abramitzky et al., 2014). Occupational scores assign to an individual the median income of
his job category in 1950 and, as discussed in Abramitzky et al. (2014), represent a proxy for
15Again in 1896, Francis A. Walker dened immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe "beaten men
from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence" (Leonard, 2005).
16See Table A1 for the list of European countries used in my work. In online appendix A, I extend the
sample to include all foreign born individuals (Section A4.5). I classify individuals based on their country
of origin following the classication made by IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2015).
17In my analysis, I focus on the age range 15-65, but results are unchanged when selecting di¤erent age
combinations. In 1920, the US Census did not report employment status, but rather only an indicator for
holding any gainful occupation. For this year, I imputed values from the latter to proxy for employment. I
also report results based solely on labor force participation rather than employment.
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lifetime earnings.
Economic activity. I digitized city-level data from the quinquennial Census of Manu-
factures between 1904 and 1929 for the following variables for the manufacturing sector: value
added by manufacture, value of products, establishment size, capital utilization (proxied by
horsepower), total employment, and average wages.18 Wage data is a potentially valuable
piece of information, since, as noted above, the US Census of Population did not collect
income data prior to 1940. While manufacturing wages were not separately reported for im-
migrants and natives, they can nonetheless be used to complement results on employment,
skill ratios, and nativesoccupational scores.
Public spending and government nances. Data on public spending and city
nances were digitized from the Financial Statistics of Cities for years 1906, 1910, 1919, and
1930.19 These are annual reports, available from 1906 onwards for cities with population
above 30,000 (until 1934) or 100,000 (from 1934 onwards). From the Financial Statistics
of Cities, I obtained data on land area, total and property tax revenues, property values,
property tax rates, and public spending (total and by category).
Presidential elections. Data on electoral returns (votes shares and turnout) for Pres-
idential elections come from Clubb et al. (1990). Since these data are available only at the
county level, I aggregated them up to the MSA, xing boundaries to 1940, and performed
the analysis using MSA-level immigration, matching cities to the corresponding MSA.20 Be-
cause Presidential elections are held every four years, I computed the average between the
closest two elections after each Census year. That is, for 1910 and 1930, I averaged electoral
results from 1912 and 1916 and from 1932 and 1936 respectively, while for 1920, I considered
1920 and 1924. Results are unchanged when taking the average from the two closest election
years, i.e. 1908 and 1912 for 1910, and 1928 and 1932 for 1930 (see Section A4.5.4 in online
appendix A).
Legislators ideology. I collected data on congressmen ideology between 1910 and
1930 from Voteview, for Congresses 61, 66, and 71 respectively.21 Following Autor et al.
(2016) as well as a vast political science literature, I proxy for politiciansideology using the
rst dimension of the Poole-Rosenthal DW Nominate scores, which rank congressmen on
an ideological scale from liberal to conservative using voting behavior on previous roll-calls
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; McCarty et al., 2006). To exploit local geographic variation, I
18I use 1909, 1919, and 1929 data to proxy for 1910, 1920, and 1930 respectively. I make use of 1904 data
to test if pre-period changes in outcomes are correlated with subsequent changes in predicted immigration.
19Since data for 1920 is missing, I digitized the 1919 and 1921 volumes. Results are robust to using 1921
in place of 1919, but 1919 is preferable since 1921 data was not reported for several cities. Data for 1906 is
used to test the validity of the empirical strategy.
20Matching cities to MSAs lowers the number of units from 180 to 127. However, data on Presidential
elections are not available for Washington DC, further reducing the number of MSAs to 126.
21To assess the validity of the empirical strategy, I also compiled data for the 56th Congress.
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restrict my attention to the House of Representatives, and use digital boundary denitions
of US congressional districts from Lewis et al. (2013) to match cities to their corresponding
district in any given year.
When constructing this dataset, two problems must be dealt with. First, boundaries of
congressional districts vary over time. Second, a single congressional district may represent
multiple cities, while the same city may belong to more than one district. To address these
issues, I follow Autor et al. (2016) and conduct the analysis at the city by congressional
district level. The city-to-congressional district mapping is almost identical for the 66th
and the 71st Congress, but redistricting between the 61st and the 66th Congress, especially
in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, prevents the construction of a balanced panel which
includes all the cities in my sample. Below, I present results both for the unbalanced panel
and for the balanced panel of cities whose congressional districts were unchanged.22
Representativesvoting behavior. Data on voting patterns on the National Origins
Act of 1924 come from Swift et al. (2000). This dataset includes the name, the district
represented, the main demographic characteristics, and the voting behavior on any rollcall
of each representative in all US Congress between 1789 and 1989. As for congressmen
ideology, I focus on the House of Representatives and conduct the analysis at the city by
congressional district, matching each representative to the corresponding city (or cities) in
my sample in the 68th Congress (when the National Origins Act was passed).23
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in my analysis. City
population ranges from more than 6.9 million (New York City in 1930) to as little as 30,200
(Pasadena in 1910). There is also wide variation in the fraction of immigrants across cities
and over time, which was higher in the northeastern states of New Jersey, New York, Con-
necticut, and Massachusetts, and lower in the US South. As already discussed in Section 2,
immigration fell signicantly between 1910 and 1930, because of both World War I and the
Immigration Acts: in 1910, the fraction of immigrants over city population was, on average,
0.18, but this number fell to 0.12 in 1930. Even starker was the decline in the fraction of
foreign born that entered the United States in the previous decade, which moved from an
average of 0.08 in 1910 to 0.02 in 1930.
Immigration and most of the scal data are available for all the 540 city-year observations
in my sample. However, employment outcomes were missing for Sacramento (CA) and New
Bedford (MA) in 1920, whereas data from the Census of Manufactures were not reported
for a handful of cities, leaving me with 538 and 525 observations respectively.24 Finally,
22The unbalanced and the balanced panels are composed respectively of 157 and 146 city to congressional
district units.
23Whenever multiple congressmen represent the same city, I average their votes on the Immigration Act
to create a unique value, which is then assigned to that city.
24Data from the Census of Manufactures were not available for Superior (WI), Washington DC in 1909 and
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aggregating cities to MSAs (for Presidential elections) and to congressional districts (for
legislatorsideology) reduces the number of observations to 378 and 470 respectively.
4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I rst introduce the baseline estimating equation (Section 4.1) and construct
the instrument for immigration (Section 4.2). Next, I present an alternative specication
which explicitly relies on the variation induced by WWI and the Immigration Acts (Section
4.3). Finally, I report rst stage results (Section 4.4).
4.1 Baseline Estimating Equation
The goal of the paper is to investigate the economic and political e¤ects of immigration
across US cities between 1910 and 1930. To do so, stacking the data for the three Census
years 1910, 1920, and 1930, I estimate
ycst = c + st + Immcst + ucst (1)
where ycst is the outcome for city c in state s in Census year t, and Immcst is the fraction of
immigrants over city population. c and st are city and state by year xed e¤ects, implying
that  is estimated from changes in the fraction of immigrants within the same city over
time, compared to other cities in the same state in a given year. Since city population could
itself be an outcome of immigration, the number of immigrants is scaled by predicted (rather
than actual) city population, constructed by multiplying 1900 population by average urban
growth in the US, excluding that of the Census division where the city is located. Below,
I also report results obtained when scaling immigration by 1900 population.25 Standard
errors are clustered at the MSA level, and MSA boundaries are xed to 1940 in order to
keep geography constant.
In my baseline specication, I restrict the attention to European immigrants that entered
the United States during the previous decade. I do so because, at that time, immigrants
could apply for citizenship after 5 years (Shertzer, 2016). While historical accounts suggest
that after 1910 immigrantspolitical engagement fell steadily (Kleppner, 1982), focusing on
recently arrived immigrants allows me to more condently interpret my ndings on political
outcomes as nativesreactions, rather than as the direct e¤ect of immigrantspreferences.
1919, and for Flint (MI), Galveston (TX), Huntington (WV), Lexington (KY), McKeesport (PA), Pueblo
(CO), Quincy (IL), and Roanoke (VA) in 1929.
25Section A4.5.2 in online appendix A also presents results using the fraction of immigrants over actual
population.
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As a robustness check, however, I repeat the analysis considering all immigrants, regard-
less of their arrival year, and results remain very similar to those obtained in my baseline
specication (see Table A20).26
4.2 Instrument for Immigration
A priori, we may expect immigrants to be attracted to cities with better job opportunities,
or with more appealing tax-public spending bundles. Alternatively, immigrants might settle
in otherwise declining cities, where house prices are lower. In either case, OLS estimates of
equation (1) will likely be biased. To deal with this endogeneity problem, I construct a mod-
ied version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001). The instrument predicts the number
of immigrants received by US cities over time by interacting 1900 settlements of di¤erent
ethnic groups with subsequent migration ows from each sending region, excluding individ-
uals that eventually settled in a given citys MSA. Formally, Immcst in (1) is instrumented
with
Zcst =
1
P^cst
X
j
jcO
 M
jt (2)
where P^cst is predicted city population; jc is the share of individuals of ethnic group j living
in city c in 1900; and O Mjt is the number of immigrants from country j that entered the US
between t and t  1, net of those that eventually settled in city cs MSA.27
The instrument constructed in equation (2) exploits two sources of variation: rst, cross-
sectional variation in the share of individuals from each ethnic group living in di¤erent US
cities in 1900 (jc); second, time-series variation induced by changes in the total number of
immigrants from any sending region entering the United States in a given decade (O Mjt ).
Figure A19 in online appendix A3 presents a simple example for three cities (Chicago, Mil-
waukee, and San Francisco) and two ethnic groups (Italians and Germans) to illustrate the
variation underlying the instrument.
4.2.1 Geographic Variation in ImmigrantsSettlements
The cross-sectional variation underlying the instrument in equation (2) is based on the idea
that immigrants cluster geographically and their settlements are highly persistent due to
social networks and family ties, and not because of local pull factors (Card, 2001; Stuart
and Taylor, 2016). As documented in Sequeira et al. (2017), the gradual expansion of the
railroad network during the second half of the nineteenth century is a strong predictor of the
26Table A20 also documents that results are unchanged when considering all immigrants, and not only
European ones.
27A similar "leave-out" strategy is also used in Burchardi et al. (2016).
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geographic distribution of immigrants in the US: places that gained access to the railroad just
before an immigration boom received more immigrants in the following decade. Moreover,
upon arrival, early settlers tended to locate in places that were relatively more attractive at
that time. Since the timing of outmigration varied widely across European countries, de-
pending on local political and economic conditions (Hatton and Williamson, 1998), di¤erent
US regions were populated by di¤erent ethnic groups before 1900. Early settlers then acted
as a catalyst for subsequent migrants from the same ethnic group (Lafortune and Tessada,
2014).
The geographic concentration of Europeans in the United States during the Age of Mass
Migration is discussed, among others, by Abramitzky and Boustan (2017). For instance,
Italians clustered in the north-eastern states of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey,
and in California, whereas Germans and Scandinavians settled mainly in the lower and in the
upper Midwest respectively. Figure 4 visually conrms these patterns in my data by plotting
the share of individuals from di¤erent European regions living in selected US cities in 1900.
While almost 4% of Swedes living in the US in 1900 were settled in Minneapolis, less than 1%
of them were located in north-eastern cities like Philadelphia or Boston. Conversely, while
Italian communities were present in Boston, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, they were
practically non-existent in Minneapolis. Even more emblematic is the example of Eastern
Europeans: in 1900, more than 8% of them were living in Cleveland, while their share in the
other cities displayed in Figure 4 was well below 1%. Figure A8 presents a similar example
for Ohio, and shows that di¤erences in immigrantssettlements existed also within the same
state. This is important, for otherwise the instrument in (2) would not have power, since
my empirical strategy exploits only within state variation in immigration.
4.2.2 Identifying Assumptions and Instrument Validity
The key identifying assumption behind the instrument is that cities receiving more immi-
grants (from each sending area) before 1900 must not be on di¤erent trajectories for the
evolution of economic and political conditions in subsequent decades.28 Said di¤erently,
outmigration from European regions must be independent of cross-city pull factors system-
atically related to 1900 settlerscountry of origin. For example, between 1910 and 1920,
immigration to the US was higher from Italy than from Sweden. The exclusion restriction
would be violated if this happened because cities that in 1900 had attracted more Italians
were growing more than cities where more Swedes had moved to in 1900.
Another threat to the validity of the identifying assumption is that the characteristics of
28As discussed and formally shown in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018), the key identifying assumption of
Bartik-style instruments (a class of instruments that includes also the shift-share) is best stated in terms of
the initial shares.
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cities that attracted early immigrants might have persistent, confounding e¤ects on migration
patterns as well as on changes in the outcomes of interest. It is possible, for instance,
that larger urban centers attracted more immigrants in the nineteenth century, and that
these cities kept growing more also in subsequent decades, introducing a spurious correlation
between, e.g. economic activity and immigration. Similarly, one may be worried that the
industry mix of cities a¤ected both the location decision of early settlers and subsequent
changes in economic and political conditions. To deal with these and similar issues, I perform
several robustness checks, which I describe below when presenting my main results.29
4.3 WWI and Quotas: First and Long Di¤erence Specications
As discussed in Section 2, WWI and the Immigration Acts induced large and exogenous vari-
ation both in the number and in the ethnic composition of immigrants received by the United
States over time. In this section, I explicitly rely on such variation to deal with the potential
concern that aggregate migration ows by country of origin, O Mjt , might be endogenous
to city-specic pull factors - something that would invalidate the instrument constructed
in equation (2). An additional advantage of exploiting WWI and the Immigration Acts is
that these shocks lowered substantially the serial correlation in migration ows to US cities
over time. This is desirable since, as noted by Jaeger et al. (2018), one potential threat to
shift-share instruments for the contemporaneous period is precisely the high persistence of
migration ows.30
I start by taking (stacked) rst di¤erences of equation (1). Next, I construct two separate
instruments for the decadal change (1910 to 1920 and 1920 to 1930) in the number of
immigrants received by a given city in the previous ten years. These instruments (ZWcs
and ZQcs in equations (3) and (4)) replace actual migration ows with a measure of
predicted immigration from each sending region constructed exploiting directly WWI and
the Immigration Acts.31
Formally, the 1910-1920 and the 1920-1930 changes in immigration are instrumented
with, respectively,
ZWcs =
1
P^cs;1920
X
j
jc (1 [Alliesj] Oj;1910  Oj;1910) (3)
29To save space, some of the robustness checks are only mentioned in the main text, and then reported
and extensively discussed in online appendix A (Section A4).
30In online appendix A, I estimate a specication similar to the "double-instrumentation" strategy pro-
posed by Jaeger et al. (2018), instrumenting the contemporaneous stock of immigrants with predicted lagged
inows. Results are unchanged (Table A20).
31Similarly to Sequeira et al. (2017), in online appendix A, I also construct a measure of predicted im-
migration that only exploits temperature and precipitation shocks in origin countries (see Sections A2 and
A4.5 of online appendix A).
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and
ZQcs =
1
P^cs;1930
X
j
jc (Qj  Oj;1920) (4)
The term Oj;1910 (resp. Oj;1920) is the number of immigrants from country j that entered the
US between 1900 and 1910 (resp. 1910 and 1920). 1 [Alliesj] in (3) is a dummy equal to 1
if sending country j belongs to the Allies in WWI, and zero otherwise. Finally, Qj in (4)
is the sum of the yearly quota for country j specied by the Immigration Acts of 1921 and
1924.
The intuition behind equation (3) is that, if a country was not part of the Allies, its
immigration was completely shut down between 1910 and 1920. If, instead, the country
belonged to the Allies, there was no change in immigration from that specic country over
this period. To visually depict this intuition, Figure A9 plots the number of immigrants that
entered the United States in the previous decade (relative to 1910) from Germany (dashed
blue line) and the UK (red line). While WWI reduced immigration for both countries, the
drop in German immigration was twice as large (relative to 1910) as that in immigration
from Great Britain.
Interacting (3) and (4) with year (i.e. 1920 and 1930) dummies, I re-estimate equation (1)
in stacked rst di¤erences with 2SLS. In formulas, the second and the rst stage equations
become
FDycs = s + SFDImmcs + FDucs (5)
and
FDImmcs = s + FW (ZWcs  ) + FQ (ZQcs  ) + "cs (6)
where FD refers to the rst di¤erence for period  , and s includes interactions between pe-
riod dummies and state dummies.32 Variables ZWcs and ZQcs in (6) are the instruments
constructed in (3) and (4) above, and are both interacted with a full set of year dummies ().
While being econometrically more demanding, this strategy allows me to perform an impor-
tant placebo check. E¤ectively, in (6) there are four instruments, but only two of them, i.e.
the interactions between ZWcs (resp. ZQcs) and the 1920 (resp. 1930) dummy, should
be statistically signicant. In Section 4.4 below, I explicitly test this implication, and show
that, reassuringly, the WWI (resp. the quota) instrument predicts changes in immigration
only when interacted with the 1920 (resp. 1930) dummy.
As a further robustness check, below, I also report results from a long di¤erences speci-
cation:
ycs = s + LImmcs + ucs (7)
32Note that, now, there are two time periods, 1920-1910 and 1930-1920, and all variables refer to the
change during that period.
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where  is the 1910-1930 change, s refers to state xed e¤ects, and the rst stage equation
is given by
Immcs = s + WZWcs + QZQcs + "cs (8)
4.4 First Stage Results
Table 2 presents rst stage results for the relationship between actual and predicted immi-
gration, after partialling out city and state by year xed e¤ects. In column 1, the dependent
variable is the fraction of immigrants over actual city population, and the regressor of in-
terest is the baseline instrument constructed in equation (2). Columns 2 and 3 replicate
column 1 by dividing the actual and the predicted number of immigrants by, respectively,
1900 and predicted population. In all cases, the F-stat is very high, and there is a strong
and signicant relationship between the fraction of immigrants and the instrument.33
Figure 5 reports the graphical analogue of column 3, plotting the relationship between
the fraction of immigrants and the instrument, after partialling out city and state by year
xed e¤ects. As it appears, the city of Passaic (NJ) experienced a large drop in immigration
between 1910 and 1930, and one may be concerned that, for this reason, it inuences the
strength of the rst stage. However, omitting this city barely a¤ects the slope of the regres-
sion line (see red dashed line in Figure 5). Online appendix A replicates Table 2, and shows
that none of the results is signicantly a¤ected when excluding Passaic from the analysis
(see Table A11 and Figure A20).
From column 3 onwards, Table 2 presents estimates for specications where both the
actual and the predicted number of immigrants are scaled by predicted city population.
Column 4 shows that the estimates are barely a¤ected when aggregating the unit of analysis
from cities to MSAs. Next, columns 5 and 6 report results for the stacked rst di¤erences
and for the long di¤erences specications, i.e. equations (6) and (8) respectively. At the
bottom of the table, columns 5 and 6 also present the p-value for the test of overidentifying
restrictions. Reassuringly, in both cases, not only the F-stat is well above conventional levels,
but also, the null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected. Furthermore,
in column 5, the interaction between year dummies and the WWI instrument is signicant
only for 1920, while that between year dummies and the quota instrument is signicant
only for 1930. Conversely, when interacting the WWI and the quota instruments with,
respectively, the 1930 and the 1920 dummies, coe¢ cients are never statistically signicant
and, especially for WWI, an order of magnitude smaller.34
33Results, not reported for brevity, are very similar to those presented in column 1 when including only
city and year xed e¤ects.
34While only the interaction between the 1930 dummy and the quota instrument is statistically signicant,
the coe¢ cient is not statistically di¤erent from that on the interaction between the quota istrument and the
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Finally, in columns 7 and 8, I augment the baseline specication by including interactions
between year dummies and the 1900 (log of) city and immigrantspopulation, and the 1904
(log of) value added by manufacture. Not surprisingly, the F-stat falls relative to column
1, but remains well above conventional levels. Similarly, even though the magnitude of
coe¢ cients becomes somewhat lower, neither their economic nor their statistical signicance
is a¤ected. As discussed in online appendix A (Section A4), results are also unchanged when
interacting year dummies with several other 1900 city characteristics, such as skill ratios,
the share of African Americans, or the employment share in manufacturing.
5 The Economic E¤ects of Immigration
In this section, I show that immigration increased nativesemployment and their occupa-
tional standing, and that, even in a sector heavily exposed to immigrantscompetition like
manufacturing, there was no signicant reduction in either employment or wages (Section
5.1). In Section 5.2, I provide evidence that this was made possible by two mechanisms: rst,
because of complementarity, natives specialized in occupations where they had a compar-
ative advantage relative to immigrants; second, rmsinvestment and industrial expansion
absorbed the supply shock brought about by immigration, and provided natives with oppor-
tunities for skill upgrading.
5.1 NativesEmployment
5.1.1 Main Results
In Table 3, I study the e¤ects of immigration on employment outcomes of native men.35
Throughout the paper, I always report the mean of the dependent variable at baseline as
well as the F-stat associated with rst stage results shown in Table 2. The dependent variable
is the employment to population ratio for native males of working age in Panel A, and the
log of nativesoccupational scores in Panel B. OLS estimates of equation (1) are reported
in column 1, while column 2 presents 2SLS results from my baseline specication, where
the fraction of immigrants (over predicted population) is instrumented with the leave-out
shift-share instrument constructed in equation (2).
Starting from employment, both OLS and 2SLS coe¢ cients are positive and signicant,
with the latter being slightly larger than the former. The point estimate in column 2 implies
1920 dummy. One possible explanation is that the literacy test introduced in 1917 was more binding for
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe - groups also more penalized during the 1920s because of the
Immigration Acts (see Section 2).
35In my baseline specication, I consider men in the age range 15 to 65, but results are robust to the use
of di¤erent age thresholds (see also Carlana and Tabellini, 2017).
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that a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of immigrants (0.05) raises natives
employment probability by 1.5% relative to its 1910 mean. Said di¤erently, for every 10
new immigrants, two more natives found a job. Panel B documents that immigration had a
strong, positive e¤ect on nativeslog occupational scores. Since occupational scores measure
cross-occupational changes in earnings, these ndings suggest that the employment e¤ects
reported in Panel A likely came from occupational and skill upgrading.36 Di¤erently from
Panel A, in Panel B, 2SLS estimates are an order of magnitude larger than OLS. One possible
explanation for this pattern is that OLS is downward biased because immigrants tended to
move to places with fewer opportunities for skill upgrading.
Subsequent columns of Table 3 explore the robustness of the main results presented
in column 2. First, to test for pre-trends, the 1900 to 1910 change in employment and
in log occupational scores is regressed against the 1910 to 1930 instrumented change in
immigration (column 3). Reassuringly, in both cases, the coe¢ cient on immigration is not
statistically signicant, very imprecisely estimated, and quantitatively di¤erent from the
estimates reported in column 2. Figures A10 and A11 provide residual scatterplots for the
reduced form estimates of specications presented in columns 2 and 3 of Panel A, and visually
conrm the pattern emerging from Table 3. Passaic (NJ) negatively inuences the slope of
the regression line in Figure A10, and the e¤ects of immigration on nativesemployment
become somewhat larger and more precisely estimated when omitting this city (see dashed
line in Figure A10 and Table A13).
In column 4, I document that scaling both the actual and the instrumented number
of immigrants by 1900, rather than predicted, population does not alter my ndings in a
signicant way. In addition, to (indirectly) address the potential concern that estimates in
column 2 may be partly due to nativesgeographic mobility (Borjas, 2016), I replicate the
analysis aggregating the unit of analysis to the MSA level (column 5).37 Reassuringly, results
remain quantitatively very similar to those reported in column 2, even though the coe¢ cient
in Panel B is no longer signicant.38
Next, columns 6 and 7 replace the baseline instrument from (2) with that constructed
exploiting directly variation induced by WWI and by the Immigration Acts (i.e., equations
(3) and (4) in Section 4.3). Column 6 reports results for the stacked rst di¤erences regression
(equation (5)), and column 7 estimates the long di¤erences specication (equation (7)).
36Very similar results (not reported for brevity) are obtained when state by year xed e¤ects are replaced
by either region by year or year xed e¤ects.
37Historical accounts suggest that, di¤erently from what happened with the Great Migration of blacks
from the South to the North of the United States (Boustan, 2010), natives did not systematically leave cities
in response to European immigration. Moreover, in line with this idea, in online appendix A I show that, if
anything, immigration promoted internal in-migration (Table A24).
38The lower precision of these estimates should not be surprising, given that when aggregating observations
up to the MSA level the number of units moves from 180 to 127.
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Coe¢ cients from the long and the stacked rst di¤erences regressions bound respectively
from above and from below those obtained using the standard shift-share instrument, and
results always remain statistically signicant and in line with those reported in column 2.
Finally, I replicate the analysis interacting year dummies with, respectively, the (log of)
1900 city and immigrantspopulation, and the (log of) 1904 value added by manufacture
(columns 8 and 9). This exercise is performed to check if the characteristics of cities that
may have attracted more immigrants before 1900 also had persistent e¤ects on the evolution
of the economic environment. In either case, results are barely a¤ected: the e¤ects of
immigration on nativesemployment and occupational scores remain statistically signicant
and quantitatively similar to the baseline estimates reported in column 2. As discussed in
online appendix A (Section A4), results are also robust to interacting year dummies with
1900 skill ratios, value of industrial production, the employment share in manufacturing,
and the fraction of blacks (see Tables A16 to A18).
In online appendix A, I perform two further robustness checks (both are discussed more
in detail in Section A4). First, I show that separately controlling for a measure of predicted
industrialization, constructed by interacting 1900 industry shares with national growth rates,
does not a¤ect any of my results (Table A19). This is important because one may be worried
that the initial location of immigrants was spuriously correlated with subsequent changes
in economic or political conditions. Second, Figure A21 plots the 2SLS coe¢ cient for the
e¤ect of immigration on nativesemployment obtained from regressions that interact year
dummies with the 1900 immigrant share of each group (jc in equation (2)).39 Reassuringly,
the coe¢ cient is very stable, reducing concerns that results might be driven by any spe-
cic immigrant group that happened to locate in e.g. booming cities before 1900 (see also
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018, for the importance of this check).
5.1.2 Placebo Checks and Manufacturing Wages
I present additional results for the e¤ects of immigration on nativesemployment in Table A4,
reporting OLS and 2SLS estimates in Panels A and B respectively. Consistent with ndings
discussed above, immigration had a positive and signicant e¤ect both on the fraction of
natives holding any gainful occupation (column 1) and on the ratio of high to low skill natives
(column 2).40 Columns 3 and 4 perform a falsication exercise and show that immigration did
not lead to employment gains for either illiterate natives or African Americans, two groups
39Equivalent results are obtained when interacting the share of the largest immigrant group in a city with
year dummies.
40The skill ratio in column 2 is measured as the log of natives holding skilled occupations to the log of
natives holding unskilled jobs. To classify workers across skill categories, I follow Katz and Margo (2014).
As for occupational scores, also for skill ratios, OLS estimates are an order of magnitude smaller than 2SLS
ones.
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for which leaving unskilled occupations, where most recent immigrants were employed, would
have been extremely di¢ cult. Also, and reassuringly, immigration had a negative, although
not statistically signicant, e¤ect on employment of previously arrived immigrants, which
vanished for those that had spent at least 20 years in the United States (Figure A23).41
Similarly, the inow of immigrants did not signicantly increase employment for natives
working as manufacturing laborers (Table A4, column 5), an occupation highly exposed
to immigrants competition (Table A3).42 It is worth noting, though, that even in this
heavily exposed occupation, immigration did not lead to employment losses among natives,
possibly because manufacturing was able to expand, in turn absorbing the immigration-
induced supply shock. In line with this idea, total employment in manufacturing increased
almost one for one with immigration (Table A4, column 6).
Even if immigration had a positive e¤ect on nativesemployment, and no negative e¤ect
even for natives working in highly exposed sectors, it is nonetheless possible that it lowered
wages at least for some workers. Unfortunately, the US Census of Population did not collect
income or wage data prior to 1940, and so, this issue cannot be directly addressed using
census data. While occupational scores can be used to proxy for nativesincome, they may
not capture short-run, within occupation changes in earnings.
To partly overcome this limitation, in column 7 of Table A4, I estimate the e¤ects of im-
migration on (log) average manufacturing wages, digitized from the Census of Manufactures.
These data do not distinguish between natives and immigrants. Since new immigrants were
closer substitutes for previously arrived immigrants than for natives, and because manufac-
turing was one of the most exposed sectors to immigrantscompetition, one can condently
interpret these results as a lower bound for the impact of immigration on nativesearnings.
The coe¢ cient in column 7 is negative but not statistically signicant, and standard
errors are very large. In addition to being very noisy, the implied magnitude is also relatively
small: according to the coe¢ cient in column 7, a ve percentage points (equivalent to a one
standard deviation) increase in the fraction of immigrants lowers wages in manufacturing by
less than 1%. Based on this evidence, one cannot conclude that, even in a heavily exposed
sector, immigration lowered wages in receiving cities. This nding is somewhat in contrast
with Goldin (1994), who nds that European immigration had a negative e¤ect on earnings
of workers in selected industries between 1890 and 1915. This discrepancy may result from
the fact that Goldin focuses on a slightly earlier period and on a di¤erent sample of cities,
or from di¤erences in the empirical strategy.
41See online appendix A, Section A5.4, for a more extensive discussion of Figure A23.
42In 1910, recent immigrants were twice as likely as natives to be employed in unskilled occupations.
Similarly, while around 21% of natives were working in manufacturing, almost 45% of immigrants were
employed in this sector.
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5.2 Mechanisms
The positive employment e¤ects estimated in Table 3 are in contrast with some results from
the contemporary immigration literature such as Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2007),
and Dustmann et al. (2017) among others, who nd a negative and signicant e¤ect of
immigration on natives labor market outcomes. My ndings are also somewhat di¤erent
from those of a number of contemporaneous cross-city studies that estimate a zero e¤ect of
immigration on nativeswages (e.g. Card, 2001, 2005). However, they are consistent with a
recent body of the literature which documents a positive impact of immigrants on natives
wages and occupational mobility due to gains from specialization and complementarity (e.g.
Peri and Sparber, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Foged and Peri, 2016).
Online appendix B lays out a theoretical framework that builds on a standard model
of directed technical change (Acemoglu, 2002) where the direct, negative e¤ect of immi-
gration on labor market outcomes of unskilled natives is counterbalanced, and potentially
reversed, by two forces. First, rmsincentives to invest in capital increase with immigration,
raising demand for both unskilled and skilled workers. Second, complementarity between
immigrants and natives induces the latter to reallocate their labor from unskilled to skilled
occupations, where they might have a comparative advantage. In what follows, I provide
evidence consistent with both mechanisms.
5.2.1 Occupational Upgrading
I start by investigating the possibility that, because of complementarity, immigration fostered
nativesoccupational mobility. In particular, in Table 4, I study the e¤ects of immigration
on the fraction of natives employed in specic occupations, exploiting the granularity of full
count census data. I proxy for the degree of exposure to immigrants competition using
the ratio of the probability that natives and immigrants held a given occupation in 1910,
reported at the bottom of Table 4: values below (resp. above) 1 indicate that immigrants
were over (resp. under) represented relative to natives (see also Table A3).43
Columns 1 to 3 consider three occupations that were heavily exposed to immigrants
competition and required relatively low skills as well as language prociency (manufacturing
laborers, waiters, and blacksmiths). While the coe¢ cient is statistically signicant only in
column 3, the point estimates are consistently negative, suggesting that natives responded
to immigration by moving away from these occupations. In line with this interpretation,
columns 4 to 6 document a signicant increase in the fraction of natives employed in more
skilled and less exposed occupations such as manufacturing foremen (column 4), electricians
43Table 4 provides a more granular analysis of results obtained in Panel B of Table 3 for nativesoccupa-
tional scores.
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(column 5), and engineers (column 6). These ndings can be e¤ectively summarized using
the words of Jewish-American economist and statistician Isaac Hourwich who, in 1912, noted
that "the e¤ect of immigration upon the occupational distribution of industrial wage earners
has been the elevation of the English-speaking workmen to the status of an aristocracy of
labor, while the immigrants have been employed to perform the rough work of all industries"
(Meyer, 1981).
Among the occupations considered in Table 4, manufacturing foremen experienced the
largest percent increase relative to the 1910 mean in response to immigration (Figure A13).
This seems plausible for two reasons. First, becoming supervisors or oor managers did not
require signicant investment in education, and so even natives that were already in the
labor force could be employed there relatively quickly. Second, as I show below, immigration
promoted the expansion of manufacturing, not only allowing to absorb the supply shock, but
also creating new job opportunities for natives. As a placebo check, Figure A14 replicates
Figure A13 focusing on immigrants arrived in the United States more than 10 years before
(rather than natives), and reassuringly shows that immigration did not favor occupational
upgrading for this group.
If immigration induced natives to specialize in more skilled occupations because of com-
plementarity, this e¤ect should be stronger when skill di¤erences between immigrants and
natives were larger. Classifying immigrants as linguistically close and far from natives using
the measure constructed by Chiswick and Miller (2005), I indeed nd that occupational up-
grading occurred only when immigrants were linguistically far from English (Figure A22).44
5.2.2 FirmsInvestment and Industrial Expansion
As noted above, for nativesemployment to increase, immigration must have also stimulated
economic activity, inducing rms to create new jobs. Otherwise, absent changes in labor
demand, it would be hard to reconcile the labor supply shock induced by immigration with
the positive employment e¤ects estimated above. To test this idea, in Table 5, I investigate
the impact of immigration on (the log of) value added per establishment and (the log of)
establishment size in Panels A and B respectively. The structure of the table mirrors that of
Table 3: columns 1 and 2 report results from the baseline specication for OLS and 2SLS,
while columns 3 to 9 repeat the same checks performed for Table 3.
2SLS estimates are positive, statistically signicant, and economically large. Coe¢ cients
in column 2 imply that a one standard deviation increase in immigration raised industrial
production and establishment size by approximately 10%.45 Figure A12 presents the residual
44See online appendix A, Section A5.3, for a more detailed description of results reported in Figure A22.
45As in Sequeira et al. (2017), who use a very di¤erent estimation strategy, OLS estimates are some-
what lower than 2SLS. One possible reason for this pattern is that OLS is downward biased as immigrants
22
scatterplot corresponding to the reduced form estimates of Panel A (column 2), and con-
rms visually the strong relationship between (predicted) immigration and value added per
establishment. Reassuringly, there is no correlation between pre-migration changes in eco-
nomic activity and subsequent (predicted) changes in immigration (column 3), and results
are robust to all checks discussed above (columns 4 to 9).46
Consistent with the strong industrial expansion documented in Table 5, I also nd that
immigration had a large e¤ect on capital utilization and on rmsproductivity (Table A5,
columns 4 and 5).47 In online appendix A, I provide suggestive evidence that these e¤ects
might have been partly due to rmsincreased propensity to adopt new technologies that
made intensive use of electricity, e.g. the assembly line (Table A23). This, in turn, might
have raised demand for managers and supervisors, and for high skilled workers such as
electricians (Goldin and Katz, 2009; Katz and Margo, 2014).
My ndings are in line both with the historical evidence reviewed in Section 2 and
with results in Ager and Hansen (2017) and Sequeira et al. (2017). Importantly, they can
explain the positive employment e¤ects brought about by immigration. First, the industrial
expansion allowed the economy to absorb the large supply shock by creating new jobs for
both high and low skilled workers. Second, it provided natives with opportunities for skill
upgrading. For instance, when describing the internal organization of production in the
booming auto industry, Stephen Meyer writes that "an ethnic division of labor prevailed
that relied on assumed stereotypical traits of di¤erent ethnic groups. The most skilled
positions were reserved for native-born Americans...The laborers and unskilled workers were
mostly the newer immigrants from southern and eastern Europe...".48
Further supporting the idea that immigration brought economic prosperity to US cities
in this period, Carlana and Tabellini (2017) document that the inow of immigrants had a
large, positive e¤ect on marriage rates of both native women and native men, as well as on
fertility and on the probability that young adults left the parental house earlier. In online
appendix A, I also show that immigration spurred internal migration of native men, again
suggesting that by increasing labor market opportunities for natives, immigrants made cities
economically more attractive (Table A24).
endogenously selected places with lower growth potential because of congestion or nativesdiscrimination.
46Results in Table 5 are robust to using di¤erent proxies for economic activity (Table A5, columns 1 to 3).
47Consistent with the literature, I proxy for capital utilitazion using the log of horsepower (results are
robust to using the log of horsepower per capita or per establishment). To estimate the e¤ects of immigration
on productivity, I assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function with two factors of production, capital and
(homogeneous) labor.
48See http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edu/Labor/L_Overview/L_Overview2.htm.
23
6 The Political E¤ects of Immigration
In this section I show that, despite its large economic benets, immigration triggered hostile
political reactions. First, cities receiving more immigrants cut tax rates and public spending,
especially in categories where either inter-ethnic interactions are more salient (education) or
poorer immigrants would get larger implicit transfers (garbage collection, sewerage), sug-
gesting that immigration lowered nativesdemand for redistribution (Section 6.1). Second,
the inow of immigrants reduced support for the pro-immigration party (i.e., Democrats)
and increased the Republican-Democrat vote margin (Section 6.2). Third, immigration was
associated with the election of more conservative representatives who were, in turn, more
likely to vote in favor of the 1924 National Origins Act (Section 6.3).
6.1 Tax Revenues and Public Spending
At least until the Great Depression, US cities were responsible for the provision of public
goods such as education, police, and spending on welfare or on infrastructure (e.g. roads,
sewerage, etc.), while the federal (or the state) government played only a marginal role
(Monkkonen, 1990). Also, since federal and state transfers were very limited, cities had to
independently raise funds to nance their expenditures. More than 75% of citiesresources
came from local taxes, with property taxes accounting for around 90% of total tax revenues
(Fisher, 1996). Even though cities could issue debt, property tax rates represented the key
(scal) policy variable at disposal of local public o¢ cials.49 It follows that, if immigration
lowered the desired level of redistribution and nativesutility from public goodsconsump-
tion, one would expect to nd larger reductions in tax revenues, and in particular in tax
rates, in cities that received more immigrants.
Motivated by this discussion, in Table 6, I study the e¤ects of immigration on tax rates
(Panel A) and public spending per capita (Panel B). As for the key economic outcomes
(Tables 3 and 5), columns 1 and 2 report results from the baseline specication for OLS and
2SLS respectively, while columns 3 to 8 repeat all the checks performed for Tables 3 and 5.50
Immigration is associated with a signicant decline in both tax rates and public spending
per capita, suggesting that the inow of immigrants lowered (natives) demand for public
services. Coe¢ cients in column 2 of Panels A and B imply that a one standard deviation
increase in the fraction of immigrants (0.05) reduced property tax rates and public spending
49Di¤erent from today, at the time, spending or tax limits were very rare in US cities.
50Data on property tax rates was not reported for the city of Pittseld (MA) in 1930: for this reason, the
number of observations in Panel A is 539, rather than 540 as in Panel B. Relative to Tables 3 and 5, Table
6 does not replicate results aggregating the unit of analysis at the MSA level, since tax rates and public
spending are the by-product of the political process taking place at the city level. See online appendix A
(Section A4) for additional robustness checks.
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per capita by, respectively, 7.5% and 5% relative to their 1910 average.
Reassuringly, the 1906 to 1910 change in neither tax rates nor public spending is corre-
lated with the 1910 to 1930 change in (instrumented) immigration (column 3). Moreover,
coe¢ cients in column 3 are close to zero and imprecisely estimated.51 When performing the
additional checks, in columns 4 to 8, the precision of the estimates for the tax rate deteri-
orates, but their magnitude remains in line with that reported in column 2. Likewise, the
relationship between public spending per capita and immigration is quantitatively similar to
that estimated in column 2 and always statistically signicant. In column 8, which includes
interactions between year dummies and the 1904 value added by manufacture, the point
estimate is twice as large (in absolute value) as that in column 2. This pattern, however, is
due to the slightly di¤erent sample for which industrial data were reported in 1904 (Table
A14).
Table A6 documents that the inow of immigrants reduced total and property tax rev-
enues per capita (columns 1 and 2). Not surprisingly, since most local government revenues
came from property taxes, coe¢ cients in columns 1 and 2 are very similar to each other.
2SLS results (Panel B) are close to OLS ones (Panel A), and imply that a one standard devi-
ation (0.05) increase in the fraction of immigrants lowered property tax revenues per capita
by 5% relative to the 1910 mean. Consistent with a net reduction in tax revenues, lower tax
rates were not compensated by a signicant increase in either property values (columns 3
and 4) or in business taxes per capita (column 5).52
Finally, Table A7 breaks down total expenditures across categories, and shows that spend-
ing cuts were larger for education (column 1) and sanitation, sewerage and garbage collection
(column 5) where inter-racial interactions are likely to be more salient and poorer immigrants
would get larger implicit transfers. Similarly, even if the coe¢ cient for spending on charities
and hospitals (column 4) is not signicant, the point estimate is quite large, relative to its
baseline mean.53
Taken together, these ndings suggest that immigration lowered (natives) demand for re-
distribution and induced cities to cut tax rates. This interpretation is consistent with several
historical accounts (e.g. Higham, 1955; Leonard, 2016). For example, in 1907, Prescott Hall,
one of the founders of an inuential anti-immigration movement, the Immigration Restric-
511906 is used because this is the rst year for which the Financial Statistics of Cities collected data in
a way that is comparable to subsequent years. Figures A15 and A16 plot the residual scatterplots of the
reduced form estimates of columns 2 and 3 (Panel A).
52In a related project, Tabellini (2017), I nd that the migration of southern born African Americans
lowered tax revenues in northern cities, but that this happened through a reduction in property values,
which resulted from whitesdecision of moving to the suburbs (see Boustan, 2010).
53An alternative interpretation for the reduction in public spending on education is that immigration
increased the number of Catholic schools, in turn reducing demand for public schools. Data limitations
prevent me from testing this possibility.
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tion League, stated that America was "receiving a great many immigrants who are not only
worth nothing to the country, but are a positive [public] expense". The inow of immigrants
may have reduced nativesdesired level of public spending for two related reasons. First,
most immigrants, at least until 1920, came from relatively poor countries, and may have
thus been perceived as a scal burden by natives. Second, ethnic diversity brought about by
immigration might have lowered preferences for redistribution among natives (Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999). In Section 7 and in online appendix A (Section A5), I
return to this issue and, exploiting variation in immigrantsbackgrounds, show that higher
cultural and ethnic diversity were associated with larger reductions in tax revenues and in
public spending.
6.2 Presidential Elections
I now investigate how immigration a¤ected electoral outcomes in receiving places. Since prior
to 1951 systematic data on municipal elections do not exist (see de Benedictis-Kessner and
Warshaw, 2016), I focus on Presidential elections between 1910 and 1930. Because electoral
results are only available at the county level, I aggregate them at the MSA level, using 1940
MSA denitions.54 In Panel A of Table 7, I focus on the Democratsvote share, reporting
OLS and 2SLS estimates from the baseline specication in columns 1 and 2, and additional
robustness checks in columns 3 to 8.
The inow of immigrants had a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on support for
Democrats, which was also economically relevant. In particular, the 2SLS coe¢ cient in col-
umn 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of immigrants reduced
the Democratsvote share by approximately 5% relative to its 1910 mean. Reassuringly, no
such relationship is found between the 1900-1910 change in the Democratsvote share and
the 1910-1930 change in the instrument (column 3). Subsequent columns of Table 7 (Panel
A) document that results are qualitatively unchanged for most robustness checks. However,
the coe¢ cient drops to zero when either using the stacked rst di¤erence specication (col-
umn 5) or interacting year dummies with 1900 city and immigrants population (column 7).
Somewhat reassuringly, though, this pattern seems to be conned to these two specications
(see additional results in online appendix A), and does not emerge when considering other
political outcomes (see Section 6.3 and Panel B of Table 7).
As I show in Table A8, the negative e¤ect of immigration on the Democratsvote share
was accompanied by increasing support for third parties (column 2) and, to a lesser extent,
for Republicans (column 1). Even if the coe¢ cient in column 1 is not statistically signi-
54As discussed in Section 3, since Presidential elections are held every four years, I computed the average
between the closest two elections after each Census year. Results are unchanged when taking the average
from the two closest election years (Table A22).
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cant, immigration had a very strong, negative e¤ect on the Democrats-Republicans margin
(column 3). Specically, the estimates in column 3 (Panel B) imply that a one standard
deviation increase in the fraction of immigrants reduced the Democrats-Republicans margin
by approximately 12% relative to its 1910 mean - a sizeable e¤ect.
While both Republicans and Democrats tried to win immigrantssupport, between 1890
and 1940, most naturalized immigrants tended to vote for the Democratic party (Shertzer,
2016).55 The Irish are probably the most emblematic example, but this was true also of
other ethnic groups such as Italians (Luconi, 1996).56 I examined the voting behavior of
members of the House who represented the 180 cities in my sample between 1910 and 1930,
nding that Democrats were signicantly less likely to vote in favor of both the literacy test
of 1917 and the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924. Even after controlling for state xed
e¤ects, immigration, and a number of 1900 city characteristics, Democratic legislators were
20 percentage points more likely to vote against the immigration restrictions.
One possible interpretation for my results is that immigration triggered nativespolitical
backlash, and reduced support for the pro-immigrant party, i.e. Democrats. These ideas
are corroborated by historical accounts, which document that, during the Progressive Era,
political reformers were often openly racists and directly involved in the eugenic society
(Leonard, 2005, 2016). The policy platform of Progressives was centered on radical urban
reforms aimed at dismantling the political machines, whose main supporters were precisely
the foreign born (e.g. Erie, 1990; Menes, 1999). Since data on votes by ethnicity (or place
of birth) are not available, these conjectures cannot be tested directly. However, they are
consistent with results obtained for the contemporaneous period by Mayda et al. (2016),
Dustmann et al. (2016), and Becker and Fetzer (2016) in the US, Denmark, and the UK
respectively.57
6.3 Congressmen Ideology and Voting Behavior
6.3.1 LegislatorsIdeology
In Panel B of Table 7, I estimate the e¤ects of immigration on the ideology of members of
the House that represented the 180 cities in my sample in each Congress corresponding to
the three Census years considered in my analysis, i.e. Congress 61 (1909-1911), Congress
66 (1919-1921), and Congress 71 (1929-1931). As discussed in Section 3, following Autor
et al. (2016), I proxy for Congress membersideology using the rst dimension of the DW
55Shertzer (2016) notes that the Democratic party was particularly appealing to foreign born because of
its support for ethnic parochial schools and its opposition to the prohibition of alcohol.
56Similarly, Kleppner (1979) estimates that more than 80% of Catholics in Iowa voted for the Democratic
party by the end of the nineteenth century.
57See also Barone et al. (2016) for Italy, and Halla et al. (2017) for Austria.
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Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; McCarty et al., 2006), and conduct the analysis
at the city by congressional district level.58 While most of the city-congressional district
combinations did not change between 1910 and 1930, redistricting between the 61st and the
66th Congress prevents the construction of a balanced panel including all cities in my sample.
For this reason, I present results for both the unbalanced panel (Table 7) and the balanced
panel that includes only cities not a¤ected by redistricting between 1910 and 1920 (Table 8,
column 2).59
In what follows, I focus on the 2SLS baseline specication, reported in column 2 of Table
7 (Panel B), but, as it appears from subsequent columns, results are robust to all the checks
discussed extensively above for other variables. Immigration had a positive and signicant
e¤ect on legislatorsNominate scores.60 Quantitatively, this e¤ect is large, and not very
di¤erent from that in Autor et al. (2016) for the impact of import competition. Specically,
a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of immigrants increases Nominate scores
by approximately 0.25 standard deviations.61 Similarly, Autor et al. (2016) estimate that a
one standard deviation increase in trade exposure raises Nominate scores by 0.36 standard
deviations.
Since the analysis is conducted at decennial frequency, most of the e¤ect of immigration
on legislatorsNominate scores comes from the election of new, more conservative repre-
sentatives, rather than from changes in the ideology of incumbent politicians.62 Note that
the increase in Nominate scores can come from the election of either more moderate (i.e.
less liberal) Democrats or more conservative (i.e. less moderate) Republicans. Moreover,
since immigration had a strong impact on the Republican-Democrat vote margin (Table A8,
column 3), the rise in Nominate scores may simply reect a shift from moderate Democrats
to moderate Republicans.
Columns 3 to 6 of Table 8 address these issues by studying if immigration a¤ected the
probability of electing, respectively, a liberal Democrat (column 3), a moderate Democrat
(column 4), a moderate Republican (column 5), or a conservative Republican (column 6).
Liberal (resp. moderate) Democrats are dened as legislators with a Nominate score below
58DW Nominate scores rank Congress members on an ideological scale from liberal to conservative using
voting behavior on previous roll-calls, with higher (lower) values indicating a more conservative (liberal)
ideology.
59To ease comparisons, column 1 of Table 8 replicates the baseline specication of Table 7 (Panel B).
60The di¤erence between OLS (column 1) and 2SLS (column 2) estimates is consistent with immigrants
endogenously choosing to locate in cities with a less hostile political environment. Column 2 of Table 8
conrms that results are similar when restricting the analysis to the balanced panel of cities to congressional
districts.
61This number is obtained by multiplying the coe¢ cient in column 2 (Panel B) by a one standard deviation
increase in immigration (0.05), and dividing it through the 1910 standard deviation in the DW Nominate
scores (0.372).
62Indeed, only in six cases, the same congressman in o¢ ce in 1910 was also in o¢ ce in 1930.
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(resp. above) the median score for Democrats in the 61st Congress. Likewise, a Republican
legislator is classied as moderate (resp. conservative) if his Nominate score is below (resp.
above) the median score for Republicans in the 61st Congress. Similar results are obtained
when classifying legislators relative to the four quartiles of the overall 1910 distribution of
Nominate scores.
The replacement of more liberal Democrats with more moderate Democrats is not re-
sponsible for the rise in Nominate scores estimated in Table 7. In fact, even though the point
estimate is not signicant at conventional levels, there is a negative and quantitatively large
e¤ect of immigration on the probability of electing a moderate Democrat (column 4). Also,
moderate Democrats are not replaced by moderate Republicans (column 5), but rather by
conservative Republicans (column 6). Figure A17 visually displays this pattern, by plotting
2SLS coe¢ cients reported in columns 3 to 6 of Table 8. Interpreting the magnitude of these
results, a one standard deviation increase in immigration raises the probability of electing
a conservative Republican by 12 percentage points relative to its 1910 mean. This e¤ect
is, once again, close to that estimated in Autor et al. (2016), who nd that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in trade exposure increases the probability of electing a conservative
Republican by 17.5 percentage points.
Results presented in Tables 7 and 8 are in line with those from a number of recent studies
documenting that the waves of refugees have increased support for right-wing, populist
parties as well as political polarization in Europe (Dustmann et al., 2016; Halla et al.,
2017). They are also consistent with the idea advanced by McCarty et al. (2006) that
immigration could be responsible for the rise in political polarization experienced by the US
in the past three decades. However, politiciansideology, measured on a liberal-conservative
scale, may be only an indirect proxy for anti-immigration sentiments. For this reason, in the
next section, I explicitly investigate the voting behavior of legislators on the 1924 National
Origins Act, the bill that ultimately put an end to the era of unrestricted immigration to
the US, and that governed American immigration policy for more than 40 years.
6.3.2 LegislatorsVoting Behavior and the National Origins Act
The National Origins Act, approved in 1924 as part of the Johnson-Reed Act, was the last
of a series of attempts undertaken by the US Congress to restrict immigration in the early
twentieth century, and remained in place until 1965. While Congress approved the literacy
test in 1917 and the Emergency Quota Act in 1921, it was not until the passage of the
National Origins Act that the inow of immigrants, especially from Eastern and Southern
Europe, was e¤ectively and permanently shut down. On the one hand, even though the
literacy test was accompanied by a heated political debate (Goldin, 1994), by the time of
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its approval it was no longer binding. On the other, the Emergency Quota Act introduced
only temporary measures, which were then made permanent (and more stringent) with the
National Origins Act of 1924.63 For these reasons, I focus on the 1924 Immigration Act, and
not on its predecessors.
As for Section 6.3.1, the analysis is conducted at the city by congressional district level,
and the attention is restricted to members of the House who represented the 180 cities in
my sample during the Congress that approved the National Origins Act, i.e. Congress 68.
Since I examine voting behavior at a specic point in time, redistricting is no longer an issue.
However, precisely because of the cross-sectional nature of the analysis, results should be
interpreted as suggestive. With this caveat in mind, columns 7 and 8 of Table 8 document a
positive and signicant relationship between a legislators propensity to vote in favor of the
National Origins Act and the 1910 to 1920 change in the fraction of immigrants received by
the city (or cities) he represented. Column 7 only includes state xed e¤ects, while column
8 also controls for a number of 1900 characteristics, such as the fraction of Europeans and
of African Americans, as well as congressmen party of a¢ liation. Even if the magnitude
of the coe¢ cient in column 8 is somewhat lower, the association between immigration and
representativesvoting behavior remains positive and signicant.
To indirectly gauge the size and the direction of the potential bias of results in columns
7 and 8 due to the impossibility of including city (and state by year) xed e¤ects, Table A15
replicates ndings in columns 1 to 6 of Table 8 using cross-sectional regressions. To mirror as
closely as possible the specication reported in columns 7 and 8, in Table A15, the 1920 DW
Nominate score is regressed on the (instrumented) 1910 to 1920 change in immigration and
on state xed e¤ects. Reassuringly, results remain statistically signicant and quantitatively
close to those reported in the main text.
As in all other columns of Table 8, in columns 7 and 8, OLS estimates are lower (in
absolute value) than 2SLS, consistent with immigrants endogenously selecting cities with
a more friendly political environment. To interpret the magnitude of these results, the
coe¢ cient in column 8 implies that, when comparing cities at the 25th and 75th percentiles
of immigration, legislators representing the more exposed city were more likely to vote in
favor of the National Origins Act by approximately 10 percentage points. While this is a
large e¤ect, it does not seem unreasonable, given that immigration was at that time (as it is
today) at the forefront of the political debate. Moreover, these ndings are quantitatively in
63The 1921 Emergency Quota Act temporarily limited the number of immigrants from any given country
that could enter the United States to 3% of the 1910 population of each ethnic group. With the 1924 National
Origins Act, which made the 1921 Immigration Act permanent, the ceiling was lowered to 2% and the "base"
year was moved to 1890. These two changes were undertaken to shut down the inow of immigrants from
"undesired" sources, such as Eastern and Southern Europe. As the Saturday Evening Post put it, "if there
is one thing we need more than another it is a little discrimination in our immigration policy" (Spiro, 2009).
30
line with those in Mian et al. (2010), who show that a one standard deviation increase in the
mortgage default rate during the 2007 Great Recession increases legislatorspropensity to
support the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act by 12.6 percentage
points.
6.4 Interpretation of Results
Taken together, results in Sections 6.1 to 6.3 suggest that immigration triggered widespread
political reactions. First, immigration reduced tax rates and public spending, possibly by
lowering nativesdemand for redistribution. Second, the inow of immigrants was associ-
ated with a fall in the Democratsvote share and an increase in the Republican-Democrat
vote margin. Third, and most importantly, cities receiving more immigrants elected more
conservative members of the House of Representatives who were in turn more likely to vote
in favor of the 1924 National Origins Act.
While the evidence in Section 6.1 is consistent with the idea that immigration triggered
nativesbacklash reactions and lowered their demand for public goods provision, there exist
a few alternative interpretations. First, at that time, after ve years immigrants could
apply for citizenship, becoming eligible to vote (Shertzer, 2016). If immigrants had di¤erent
preferences relative to natives, changes in public spending and in tax rates may have resulted
from the direct e¤ect of immigrantspreferences rather than from nativesreactions. This
idea, however, is inconsistent with electoral results presented in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, and with
the historical literature documenting that, after 1910, the political involvement of foreign
born fell steadily.64 Moreover, it seems somewhat implausible that poorer immigrants, who
would have benetted from higher redistribution, voted in favor of lower tax rates and public
spending.
A second interpretation is that immigration altered the income distribution in receiving
cities and, for reasons unrelated to political backlash, shifted nativespreferences towards
a lower tax rate-public spending bundle. In particular, since immigrants fostered economic
activity and increased nativesoccupational standing, it is possible that the (native) median
voter became richer, in turn voting to cut taxes and limit redistribution (e.g. Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). Lack of systematic income or wage data, unfortunately, prevents me from
testing this interpretation in detail.
However, two pieces of evidence provided in my work suggest that this mechanism alone
cannot explain the negative e¤ects of immigration on public spending and tax rates estimated
in Table 6. First, legislators representing cities that received more immigrants were more
likely to support the passage of the immigration restrictions (Section 6.3). Second, as I
64For this reason, Kleppner (1982) refers to this historical period as the "Demobilization Era".
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show below, immigration had heterogeneous e¤ects on taxes and spending, which depended
on immigrants religious a¢ liation, and more generally, on the cultural distance between
immigrants and natives (Section 7).
Yet another possibility is that immigration increased demand for housing and thus rents.
While this might have benetted homeowners, it might have nonetheless increased the cost
of living for natives who did not own a house.65 Two pieces of evidence seem to weigh
against this idea. First, as discussed in Section 6.1, immigration did not have any signicant
e¤ect on property values. Second, to more directly investigate the possibility that higher
rents fueled nativesdiscontent, in online appendix A, I also check that immigration was
not correlated with rents paid by natives (Figure A24). One possible explanation for this
pattern is that immigrants represented a production amenity, but were perceived by natives
as a consumption disamenity.66
Finally, it is possible that, even if immigration had aggregate positive economic e¤ects,
some natives were made worse o¤, at least in the short run (e.g. Goldin, 1994). Again,
lack of detailed earnings data does not allow me to completely rule out this interpretation,
but the fact that neither wages nor employment in manufacturing were signicantly a¤ected
(Table A4, columns 5 and 7) seems to weigh against it. As noted above, manufacturing was
the sector most exposed to immigrantslabor market competition, and wage data digitized
from the Census of Manufactures do not distinguish between immigrants and natives. Thus,
if immigration had any negative e¤ects on nativesincome or employment, this is precisely
where one would expect to nd them. Moreover, as argued below, the heterogeneous e¤ects
of immigration, which depended on the cultural distance between immigrants and natives,
suggest that nativesresponses were not driven only by economic, but also by cultural con-
siderations.
7 Backlash, Cultural Distance, and Ethnic Diversity
If immigration was economically benecial and did not reduce employment even for na-
tives in highly exposed occupations, why did backlash emerge? In this section, exploiting
variation in the "mix" of immigrants received by US cities over time, I show that cultural
di¤erences between immigrants and natives were responsible, at least in part, for natives
anti-immigration reactions.
65In 1910, only 40% of natives living in the cities in my sample were homeowners.
66This idea is consistent with ndings of several papers for both Europe and the US today (e.g. Card
et al., 2012; Saiz and Wachter, 2011).
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7.1 Cultural Distance: Religious A¢ liation
The historical evidence reviewed in Section 2.3 suggests that opposition to immigration
during the Age of Mass Migration tended to have deep cultural roots. Anti-immigration
sentiments were often directed towards Jews and Catholics, whose values were perceived as
a threat to the Puritan tradition prevailing in the US at that time (Higham, 1955; Spiro,
2009). One of the best examples for the strength of these sentiments is the revival of the Ku
Klux Klan in the 1920s, which openly embraced an anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic ideology.
Similarly, immigrants from non Anglo-Saxon and non English-speaking countries were the
main target of the anti-immigration rhetoric at that time (Abramitzky et al., 2018; Leonard,
2016).
Motivated by these observations, I proxy for cultural distance between natives and im-
migrants using, respectively, religion and linguistic distance from English. Starting from
religion, I estimate
ycst = c + st + 1Imm
Non Prot
cst + 2Imm
Prot
cst + ucst (9)
where ImmNon Protcst (resp. Imm
Prot
cst ) is the fraction of Jews or Catholics (resp. Protestant)
immigrants. In practice, equation (9) is estimated using two separate instruments, one
for each religious group, constructed by summing predicted immigration from each sending
region (see (2) in Section 4.2) across non-Protestant and Protestant countries respectively.
Results are reported in Table 9, for both OLS (Panel A) and 2SLS (Panel B). Immi-
gration had a negative and signicant e¤ect on taxes and spending only when immigrants
came from non-Protestant countries (columns 1 to 4), whereas the coe¢ cient on Protestant
immigrants is quantitatively very small (or even positive, as in columns 1 and 2) and never
statistically signicant.67 Turning to electoral outcomes, even though both non-Protestant
and Protestant immigrants seem to reduce the Democrat-Republican vote margin, results
are statistically signicant only for the former (column 5).
To more directly investigate the rise of anti-Catholic sentiments, in column 6, I study if
the 1910-1930 (instrumented) change in Catholic and Protestant immigration had an e¤ect
on the percent of votes received by Alfred Smith in 1928 Presidential elections. Smith was the
rst Roman Catholic to run for presidency for the Democratic party, and historical accounts
67Since the e¤ects of Protestant immigrants are very imprecisely estimated, and because the AP F-stat is
substantially larger for Catholic and Jewish immigration, one may be concerned that results in columns 1
to 4 are mechanically due to the fact that the latter groups are driving most of the variation in immigration
between 1910 and 1930. To check that this was not the case, I re-estimated (9) replacing political outcomes
with employment. Di¤erently from Table 9, results for both non-Protestant and Protestant immigrants were
both positive, statistically signicant, and very similar in magnitude: a one standard deviation change in
Protestant (resp. non-Protestant) immigration increased nativesemployment probability by 0.8 (resp. 1.0)
percentage points. When dropping the city of Passaic (NJ), the point estimates were exactly the same.
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consider his religious a¢ liation one of the main reasons for his defeat (Slayton, 2001). Since
results in column 6 are obtained from cross-sectional regressions, they should be interpreted
with some caution. However, the strong, negative association between Catholic (but not
Protestant) immigrants and the percent of votes received by Smith is consistent with the
idea that immigration triggered nativesbacklash in receiving areas.
Finally, column 7 indicates that the increase in legislatorsideology was entirely due to
non-Protestant immigration, while the e¤ect of Protestant immigrants is an order of mag-
nitude smaller and very imprecisely estimated. Likewise, legislatorspropensity to support
the 1924 National Origins Act is strongly correlated with the 1910-1920 change in Catholic
and Jewish immigration (column 8). Conversely, there is a negative, albeit not signicant,
correlation between the 1910-1920 change in the fraction of Protestant immigrants and the
probability of voting in favor of the immigration restrictions.68
7.2 Linguistic Distance and Ethnic Diversity
As an alternative proxy for cultural di¤erences between immigrants and natives, I rely on the
measure of linguistic distance constructed by Chiswick and Miller (2005) briey discussed
in Section 5.2.1.69 First, I compute the weighted average of immigrantslinguistic distance
from English, LDcst =
P
j
 
shjcst  Lj

, where shjcst is the share of ethnic group j among the
foreign born population of city c in Census year t, and Lj is the linguistic distance between
country j and English. Then, I re-estimate (1) using as main regressor of interest LDcst,
always controlling for the (instrumented) fraction of immigrants and instrumenting the actual
shares (shjcst) with the same logic of the instrument in (2).
70 To ease the interpretation of
results, presented in Table 10, I standardize LDcst by subtracting its mean and dividing it
by its standard deviation.
Consistent with the qualitative evidence discussed in Section 2.3, higher linguistic dis-
tance is associated with larger reductions in taxes and public spending (columns 1 to 4).
Moreover, and similarly to Table A7, the fall in spending is concentrated in education and,
even though the point estimate is not statistically signicant, in categories where inter-
ethnic interactions are likely to be more salient (columns 5, 7, and 8). These results seem
to strongly reject the idea that nativesreactions were primarily driven by economic con-
siderations, since it was precisely immigration from linguistically far countries that boosted
68These ndings are in line with results in DAmico and Tabellini (2017), who document that only Catholic
and Jewish, but not Protestant, immigration increased the frequency of racist terms in local newspapers.
69Chiswick and Miller (2005)s measure is an increasing function of how di¢ cult it is for English (native)
speakers to learn foreign languages. See also Bleakley and Chin (2010) for a study on the e¤ect of English
procieny on immigrantsassimilation in more recent times.
70The estimated e¤ect of immigration is not reported to save space. However, I always report the AP
F-stat associated with its rst stage.
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nativesoccupational standing (see Section 5.2.1 and Figure A22).
Findings in Table 10 are robust to simultaneously including a (standardized) index of
average literacy among immigrants, thus reducing concerns that they might be capturing not
only cultural, but also economic attributes of the foreign born (Table A9).71 Not surprisingly,
since there are now three di¤erent endogenous regressors and three instruments, the precision
of the estimates deteriorates relative to Table 10. Nonetheless, only linguistic distance has
a signicant e¤ect on taxes and public spending. Moreover, except for columns 7 and 8, the
coe¢ cient on linguistic distance is an order of magnitude larger (in absolute value) than that
on literacy.
Di¤erently from what one may expect, the correlation between the fraction of non-
Protestant immigrants and the index of linguistic distance is as low as 0.05, suggesting
that ndings for linguistic diversity are unlikely to merely replicate those for religious a¢ li-
ation. To more directly investigate the relationship between religion and linguistic distance,
in online appendix A, I replicate Table 9 including simultaneously both measures to run a
horse-race between the two (Table A26).
In online appendix A, I provide additional evidence that nativesbacklash was at least in
part driven by non-economic concerns by showing that the (negative) e¤ect of immigration
on redistribution was larger when ethnic diversity among foreign born was higher (Table
A27). These ndings are consistent with the large literature showing that ethnic diversity
is associated with lower public goods provision and with more limited redistribution (e.g.
Alesina et al., 1999; Beach and Jones, 2017; Luttmer, 2001).
8 Conclusions
Today, immigration is at the forefront of the political debate, and immigrants are increasingly
opposed on both economic and cultural grounds. In this paper, I exploit variation in the
number of immigrants received by US cities between 1910 and 1930 to jointly study the
political and economic consequences of an episode of mass immigration. Using a leave-out
version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001), I show that immigration had a positive and
signicant e¤ect on nativesemployment and occupational standing, as well as on economic
activity. However, despite these economic benets, the inow of immigrants also generated
hostile political reactions, inducing cities to cut tax rates and limit redistribution, leading
71The literacy index was constructed as LITcst =
P
j

shjcst  Litjt

, where Litjt is the average literacy
rate of males in working age from ethnic group j who entered the US in the previous decade. To ease the
interpretation of results, I multiplied LITcst by  1, so that higher values of this index can be interpreted as
lower average literacy among immigrants, and can be directly compared to LDcst. The correlation between
LDcst and LITcst is relatively low, with a value of 0.26.
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to the election of more conservative legislators, and increasing support for the introduction
of immigration restrictions.
Exploiting variation in immigrantsbackground, I document that nativesbacklash was
increasing in the cultural distance between immigrants and natives. These ndings suggest
that opposition to immigration may arise not only because of economic, but also because
of cultural considerations. Moreover, they highlight the existence of a potential trade-o¤.
Immigrants may bring larger economic gains when they are more di¤erent from natives.
However, higher distance between immigrants and natives may trigger stronger political
backlash. Ultimately, by retarding immigrantsassimilation, and favoring the rise of pop-
ulism and the adoption of ine¢ cient policies, nativesreactions may be economically and
socially costly in the medium to long run.
Findings in this paper provide motivation for future work in several directions. First,
one key question not addressed here is how the e¤ects of immigration are mediated by the
economic, political, and social environment in receiving places. To deal with the recent
inows of refugees, many European countries started to implement allocation policies, and
answering this question would thus have rst-order policy implications. Second, in light of
the contrasting economic and political e¤ects documented in my work, it would be interest-
ing to investigate the intergenerational mobility consequences of immigration. On the one
hand, immigration can increase nativesoccupational mobility by pushing them up along
the occupational ladder. On the other, by inducing receiving places to limit redistribution,
immigration may widen inequality not only between natives and immigrants, but also within
natives.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
VARIABLES Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Panel A. City Demographics
Fr. all immigrants 0.152 0.149 0.097 0.007 0.518 540
Fr. recent immigrants 0.042 0.026 0.044 0.001 0.343 540
Recent immigrants over
1900 population 0.074 0.048 0.078 0.002 0.678 540
City population (1,000s) 190.1 76.05 510.4 30.20 6,930 540
Panel B. Economic Outcomes
Employed 0.858 0.889 0.071 0.648 0.952 538
Log occupational scores 3.263 3.265 0.047 3.080 3.427 538
Value added per
establishment 87.66 65.92 74.47 7.945 556.3 525
Establishment size 52.86 43.09 37.98 5.465 229.9 525
Panel C. Political Outcomes
Tax rate per 1,000$ of
assessed valuation 29.42 25.78 16.48 6.450 114.3 539
Expenditures per capita 14.57 12.89 7.336 3.443 49.99 540
Democrats’ vote share 0.482 0.465 0.189 0.103 0.967 378
DW Nominate Score 0.178 0.334 0.338 -0.578 0.991 470
Note: the sample includes a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930. Employed is the
employment to population ratio for native men in the age range (15-65). Fr. all immigrants (resp. Fr. recent immigrants) is the total number of European immigrants
(resp. the number of European immigrants arrived in the last 10 years) divided by city population.
Table 2. First Stage
Dep. Variable: Fraction of Immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Z 0.840*** 0.968*** 0.999*** 0.948*** 0.893*** 0.900***
(0.056) (0.064) (0.059) (0.104) (0.091) (0.081)
ZW*1920 0.774*** 0.838***
(0.106) (0.067)
ZQ*1930 0.771** 1.236***
(0.349) (0.188)
ZW*1930 0.064
(0.082)
ZQ*1920 0.464
(0.423)
1900 population X
Predicted population X
MSA analysis X
WWI-Quotas IV First Diff. Long Diff.
Year by 1900 Log City andimm pop
Value added
manuf.
F-stat 225.1 226.7 288.3 82.65 106.8 207.4 96.48 124.8
P-value Overid. Test 0.456 0.432
Cities 180 180 180 127 180 180 180 176
Observations 540 180 540 379 360 180 540 528
Note: the sample includes a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930. In Col 1 the actual number
of immigrants is scaled by actual population, and the instrument is the leave-out version of the shift-share IV in equation (2) (Section 4.2). Cols 2 and 3 replicate Col
1 by scaling the actual and predicted number of immigrants by, respectively, 1900 and predicted population. From Col 3 onwards, Table 2 presents results from
specifications where both the predicted and the actual number of immigrants are scaled by predicted population. Col 4 replicates the analysis aggregating the unit of
analysis at the MSA level. Cols 5 and 6 estimate stacked first differences equation (6) and long differences equation (8) replacing the standard shift-share instrument
with those constructed exploiting World War I and the quotas (equations (3) and (4) in Section 4.3). Cols 7 and 8 include the interaction between year dummies and,
respectively, the (log of) 1900 city and immigrants population, and the (log of) 1904 value added by manufacture per establishment. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for
weak instrument. Cols 5-6 report the p-value for the test of overidentifying restrictions. All regressions partial out city and state by year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the MSA level, in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 3. Immigration and NativesEmployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS 2SLS Pre-Trends 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Natives’Employment to Population Ratio (1910 Mean: 0.911)
Fr.
Immigrants
0.287*** 0.299*** -0.117 0.213*** 0.330*** 0.213*** 0.362*** 0.226*** 0.280***
(0.043) (0.064) (0.112) (0.048) (0.115) (0.043) (0.076) (0.061) (0.081)
Panel B. Natives’ Log Occupational Scores (1910 Mean: 3.245)
Fr.
Immigrants
0.000 0.097*** 0.026 0.070*** 0.060 0.082** 0.124*** 0.082* 0.112***
(0.053) (0.036) (0.066) (0.026) (0.067) (0.033) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039)
F-stat 251.3 313.0 175.3 82.65 102.2 207.4 82.91 107.5
Observations 538 538 180 538 379 356 180 538 526
Covariates & sample restrictions
Immigrants
over 1900pop. X
MSA analysis X
WWI-Quotas
IV Stacked FD Long Diff
Year by 1900 City andimmig. pop
Value added
manuf.
Note: this table presents results for a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930, restricting the attention to native men
in the age range 15 to 65 who are not enrolled in schools. The dependent variable is natives’ employment to population ratio in Panel A, and natives’ log occupational scores in Panel
B. Occupational scores are computed by IPUMS, and assign to an individual the median income of his job category in 1950. Col 1 and 2 present OLS and 2SLS results for the baseline
specification (equation (1)). Col 3 regresses the 1900-1910 change in the outcomes against the 1910-1930 change in instrumented immigration. Cols 4 and 5 replicate Col 2 by,
respectively, scaling the number of immigrants by 1900 population and aggregating the unit of analysis to the MSA level. Cols 6 and 7 estimate stacked first differences equation (5)
and long differences equation (7) replacing the standard shift-share instrument with those constructed exploiting World War I and the quotas (equations (3) and (4) in Section 4.3). Cols
8 and 9 include the interaction between year dummies and, respectively, the (log of) 1900 city and immigrants population, and the (log of) 1904 value added by manufacture per
establishment. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. All regressions include city and state by year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, in
parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table 4. Immigration and NativesOccupational Upgrading
High Immigrants’Competition Low Immigrants’ Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction Natives: Manuf. Laborers Waiters Blacksmiths Manuf. Foremen Electricians Engineers
Panel A: OLS
Fr. Immigrants -0.026 -0.015 -0.008** 0.020*** 0.010** 0.017*
(0.048) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010)
Panel B: 2SLS
Fr. Immigrants -0.057 -0.015 -0.011** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.031***
(0.037) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
F-stat 251.3 251.3 251.3 251.3 251.3 251.3
Mean dep var 0.038 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.021
Natives/Immigrants
Ratio (1910) 0.220 0.583 0.750 3.500 3.667 4.200
Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538
Note: this table presents results for a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930 (see Table A2 in the
appendix). The dependent variable is the fraction of native males in working age (15-65) employed in the occupation reported at the top of each column. Panels A
and B report, respectively, OLS and 2SLS results. Fr. Immigrants is the fraction of immigrants arrived in the previous decade over predicted city population, and is
instrumented using the baseline version of the instrument constructed in Section 4.2 (see (2) in the main text). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument.
Natives/Immigrants Ratio (1910) refers to the ratio of native to immigrant workers in a given skill category or occupation in 1910. All regressions include city and
state by year fixed effects. The mean of each dependent variable at baseline is shown at the bottom of the Table. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA level,
in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 5. Immigration and Economic Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS 2SLS Pre-Trends 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Log Value Added per Establishment
Fr.
Immigrants
2.057*** 2.889*** 0.031 2.105*** 4.484*** 1.778*** 2.277*** 2.465** 2.423**
(0.703) (0.954) (0.414) (0.730) (1.084) (0.665) (0.729) (1.073) (1.113)
Panel B. Log Establishment Size
Fr.
Immigrants
2.195*** 2.532*** 0.051 1.726*** 4.539*** 1.983*** 2.146*** 1.945** 2.590***
(0.614) (0.815) (0.458) (0.596) (0.981) (0.596) (0.720) (0.931) (0.972)
F-stat 270.5 272.6 198.2 80.23 106.0 199.4 89.38 124.7
Observations 525 525 176 525 370 347 169 525 519
Covariates & sample restrictions
Immigrants
over 1900pop. X
MSA analysis X
WWI-Quotas
IV Stacked FD Long Diff
Year by 1900 City andimmig. pop
Value added
manuf.
Note: this table presents results for a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930, and for which data
were reported in the Census of Manufacture between 1909 and 1929. The dependent variable is the log of value added per establishment in Panel A, and the log of
establishment size in Panel B. Col 1 and 2 present OLS and 2SLS results for the baseline specification (equation (1)). Col 3 regresses the 1904-1910 change in the
outcomes against the 1910-1930 change in instrumented immigration. Cols 4 and 5 replicate Col 2 by, respectively, scaling the number of immigrants by 1900
population and aggregating the unit of analysis to the MSA level. Cols 6 and 7 estimate stacked first differences equation (5) and long differences equation (7)
replacing the standard shift-share instrument with those constructed exploiting World War I and the quotas (equations (3) and (4) in Section 4.3). Cols 8 and 9
include the interaction between year dummies and, respectively, the (log of) 1900 city and immigrants population, and the (log of) 1904 value added by manufacture
per establishment. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. All regressions include city and state by year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at
the MSA level, in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table 6. Tax Rates and Public Spending Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS Pre-Trends 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A: Property Tax Rate (1910 Mean: 19.75)
Fr. Immigrants -28.49*** -29.44* -4.204 -16.09 -24.29 -38.16** -21.42 -19.38
(10.60) (16.95) (8.224) (11.56) (19.35) (14.88) (21.22) (19.73)
F-stat 292.7 320.6 230.4 106.2 204.5 97.37 124.2
Observations 539 539 179 539 359 179 539 527
Panel B: Public Spending per Capita (1910 Mean: 12.16)
Fr. Immigrants -5.958 -8.699* 0.460 -5.794* -5.739* -11.34* -12.01** -17.18***
(3.900) (4.453) (4.135) (3.178) (2.970) (6.197) (5.490) (4.421)
F-stat 288.3 318.3 226.7 106.8 207.4 96.48 124.8
Observations 540 540 180 540 360 180 540 528
Covariates & sample restrictions
Immigrants
over 1900pop. X
WWI-Quotas
IV Stacked FD Long Diff
Year by 1900 City andimmig. pop
Value added
manuf.
Note: this Table presents results for a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930. The dependent
variable is the property tax rate for $1,000 of assessed valuation in Panel A, and public spending per capita in Panel B. Cols 1 and 2 present OLS and 2SLS results for
the baseline specification (equation (1)). Col 3 regresses the 1906-1910 change in the outcomes against the 1910-1930 change in instrumented immigration. Col 4
replicates Col 2 by scaling the number of immigrants by 1900 population. Cols 5 and 6 estimate stacked first differences equation (5) and long differences equation
(7) replacing the standard shift-share instrument with those constructed exploiting World War I and the quotas (equations (3) and (4) in Section 4.3). Cols 7 and 8
include the interaction between year dummies and, respectively, the (log of) 1900 city and immigrants population, and the (log of) 1904 value added by manufacture
per establishment. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. All regressions include city and state by year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at
the MSA level, in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 7. Presidential Elections and DW Nominate Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS Pre-Trends 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A: Democrats’ Vote Share (1910 Mean: 0.490)
Fr. Immigrants -0.528*** -0.404*** -0.147 -0.313*** 0.048 -0.606*** 0.169 -0.271
(0.119) (0.141) (0.157) (0.112) (0.162) (0.167) (0.271) (0.169)
F-stat 83.14 64.54 55.42 23.43 35.76 35.64 67.73
Observations 378 378 123 378 252 126 378 378
Panel B: DW Nominate Scores (1910 Mean: 0.165)
Fr. Immigrants 0.745 1.658** 0.052 1.174** 1.908** 1.168 1.760* 2.403
(0.514) (0.808) (0.909) (0.559) (0.779) (0.843) (1.025) (1.507)
F-stat 23.11 25.92 70.30 8.571 15.39 10.75 34.13
Observations 460 460 135 460 303 146 460 451
Covariates & sample restrictions
Immigrants
over 1900pop. X
WWI-Quotas
IV Stacked FD Long Diff
Year by 1900 City andimmig. pop
Value added
manuf.
Note: In Panel A, the dependent variable is the Democrats’ vote share in Presidential elections, and the sample includes the balanced panel of the 126 metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) containing at least one of the 180 cities in my sample. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the first dimension of DW Nominate scores of members of the House of
Representatives, for the panel of city-to-congressional district units for Congress 61, 66, and 71, for the 180 cities considered in my sample. Cols 1 and 2 present OLS and 2SLS results
for the baseline specification (equation (1)). Col 3 regresses the 1900-1910 change in outcomes against the 1910-1930 change in instrumented immigration. Col 4 replicates Col 2 by
scaling the number of immigrants by 1900 population. Cols 5 and 6 estimate stacked first differences equation (5) and long differences equation (7) replacing the standard shift-share
instrument with those constructed exploiting World War I and the quotas (equations (3) and (4) in Section 4.3). Cols 7 and 8 include the interaction between year dummies and,
respectively, the (log of) 1900 city and immigrants population, and the (log of) 1904 value added by manufacture per establishment. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument.
All regressions include MSA (Panel A) or congressional district to city (Panel B) and state by year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, in parenthesis. ***
p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table 8. Congressmen Ideology and the National Origins Act of 1924
Dep. Variable: DW Nominate Scores Pr. that Winner has Given Political Orientation 1[Restrict Immigration]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: OLS
Fr. Immigrants 0.745 0.603 -0.045 -0.804 -0.290 1.238 2.121* 2.024
(0.514) (0.521) (0.317) (0.711) (0.991) (1.135) (1.189) (1.362)
Panel B: 2SLS
Fr. Immigrants 1.658** 1.575* -0.601 -1.655 -0.198 2.592* 3.784** 3.365*
(0.808) (0.841) (0.817) (1.039) (1.717) (1.354) (1.569) (1.770)
F-stat 23.11 19.56 23.11 23.11 23.11 23.11 88.05 39.34
Mean dep var 0.165 0.150 0.167 0.161 0.359 0.314 0.676 0.676
Observations 470 437 470 470 470 470 155 155
Balanced Panel X
Political
Orientation
Liberal
Democrat
Moderate
Democrat
Moderate
Republican
Conservative
Republican
Note: Cols 1 to 6 report results for the panel of city-to-congressional district units for Congress 61, 66, and 71, for the 180 cities considered in my sample (see Table
A2). Because of redistricting between the 61st and the 66th Congress, it was not possible to construct a balanced panel including all city-congressional district cells in
my sample. For this reason, Col 2 restricts the attention to the balanced panel of cities (to congressional districts) that were not affected by redistricting. The
unbalanced (resp. balanced) panel is composed of 157 (resp. 146) units of observations. Cols 7 and 8 present results from a cross-sectional regression for the 155
combinations of cities to congressional districts in Congress 68, for the 180 cities considered in my sample. Panels A and B report, respectively, OLS and 2SLS
results. The dependent variable is the first dimension of the DW Nominate score in Cols 1 and 2, an indicator for electing a politician with a given political
orientation (see bottom of the Table) in Cols 3 to 6, and an indicator for voting in favor of the 1924 National Origins Act in the House of Representatives. Fr.
Immigrants is the fraction of immigrants arrived in the previous decade over predicted city population, and is instrumented using the baseline version of the
instrument constructed in Section 4.2 (see (2) in the main text). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Cols 1 to 6 include city by congressional district
and state by year fixed effects. Cols 7 and 8 control for state fixed effects. Col 8 also includes the 1900 log of black, immigrants, and total population, as well as the
share of Democratic legislators representing the city (to congressional district) in the 68 th Congress. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district
level, in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 9. Immigration and Religion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Total tax
revenues PC
Property tax
revenues PC
Property tax
rate
Public
spending PC
Dem-Rep.
margin
Smith’s pct.
votes
DW Nominate
Scores
1[Restrict
Immigration]
Panel A: OLS
Fr. Non-Prot. -13.69 -11.82 -32.53** -8.422 -1.279*** -2.605*** 1.053 2.888*
(9.424) (7.979) (13.68) (5.149) (0.269) (0.542) (0.822) (1.571)
Fr. Prot. 25.96 17.69 -4.948 9.853 1.440 2.512 -0.580 -2.655
(23.52) (22.64) (50.18) (21.75) (1.103) (1.819) (1.191) (3.487)
Panel B: 2SLS
Fr. Non-Prot. -13.56* -12.73* -32.11* -9.645** -0.571** -3.027*** 1.912** 4.946***
(8.051) (7.475) (17.09) (4.819) (0.282) (0.502) (0.895) (1.807)
Fr. Prot. 12.33 4.284 -6.984 -0.430 -0.593 3.711 0.394 -4.151
(25.47) (22.42) (71.54) (15.95) (0.802) (2.416) (1.915) (4.954)
KP F-stat 26.37 26.37 26.23 26.37 37.94 35.87 32.16 23.74
F-stat (Non-Prot) 115.9 115.9 118.9 115.9 53.37 40.18 85.91 69.49
F-stat (Prot) 27.53 27.53 27.39 27.53 38.95 36.58 32.27 21.68
Mean of dep var 12.76 12.10 19.75 12.16 0.180 0.398 0.165 0.676
Observations 540 540 539 540 378 126 460 155
Note: this Table presents results for a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930. The analysis is conducted at the
MSA rather than at the city level, fixing boundaries using 1940 definitions in Cols 5 and 6, and at the city to congressional district level in Cols 7 and 8. Panels A and B report,
respectively, OLS and 2SLS results. The dependent variable is displayed at the top of each column. 1[Restrict Immigration] (Col 8) is an indicator for voting in favor of the 1924
National Origins Act in the House of Representatives. In Cols 1 to 5 and in Col 7, Fr. Non-Prot. (resp. Prot.) refers to the fraction of immigrants arrived in the previous decade from
non-Protestant (resp. Protestant) countries, over predicted city population, for each of the three decades, 1910, 1920, and 1930. In Cols 6 and 8, Fr. Non-Prot. (resp. Prot.) is the 1910
to 1930 (1910 to 1920) change in the fraction of recent immigrants from non-Protestant (resp. Protestant) countries over predicted city population. Each endogenous regressor is
instrumented with the predicted fraction immigrants (see (2) in Section 4.2), obtained by summing (predicted) immigration across non-Protestant and Protestant countries. F-stat (Non-
Prot) and F-stat (Prot) refer to the partial F-stats for joint significance of the instruments in the two separate first-stage regressions. KP F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F stat for joint
significance of instruments. Cols 1 to 4 (resp. 5) include city (resp. MSA) and state by year fixed effects, while Col 7 includes congressional district by city and state by year fixed
effects. Cols 6 and 8 present results from a cross-sectional regression and control for state dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; **
p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table 10. Linguistic Distance and Redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Total tax
revenues PC
Property tax
revenues PC
Property tax
rate
Public
spending PC
Education Police Charities and
Hospitals
Sanitation
Panel A: OLS
Ling. Distance -0.361* -0.346 -1.485* -0.213 -0.050 -0.032 -0.010 -0.045
(0.205) (0.212) (0.840) (0.160) (0.060) (0.021) (0.039) (0.029)
Panel B: 2SLS
Ling. Distance -0.875* -0.809* -2.308 -0.519* -0.199* -0.013 -0.119 -0.053
(0.468) (0.458) (1.598) (0.301) (0.117) (0.042) (0.084) (0.052)
KP F-stat 21.02 21.02 21.47 21.02 21.14 21.02 16.31 21.02
F-stat (Imm.) 123.1 123.1 124.7 123.1 106.9 123.1 101.6 123.1
F-stat (Ling.) 50.38 50.38 53.48 50.38 48.05 50.38 34.06 50.38
Mean of dep var 12.76 12.10 19.75 12.16 4.250 1.338 0.635 1.129
Observations 540 540 539 540 534 540 516 540
Note: this Table presents results for a balanced panel of the 180 US cities with at least 30,000 residents in each Census year 1910, 1920, and 1930. Panels A and B
report, respectively, OLS and 2SLS results. The dependent variable is displayed at the top of each column. In Cols 5 to 8, the dependent variable is spending per
capita on the category listed at the top of the column. The main regressor of interest is the (standardized) weighted average linguistic distance constructed in Section
7.2, instrumented using predicted shares of immigrants from each sending region obtained from (2) in Section 4.2. F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F stat for joint
significance of instruments. F-stat (Imm.) and F-stat (Ling.) refer to the partial F-stats for joint significance of the instruments in the two separate first-stages. All
regressions include the main effect of immigration (instrumented with the baseline shift-share instrument from (2)), and control for city and state by year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, in parenthesis. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Figure 1. Immigrants as a Percent of US Population
Note: The solid line shows the number of legal immigrants as a percent of US population. The dashed line includes also the
estimated number of illegal immigrants, available from 2000 onwards. Source: the number of legal immigrants comes from
the Migration Policy Institute, while the number of illegal immigrants was taken from the Pew Research Center tabulations
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Figure 2. Share of Foreign Born in the United States, by Region
Note: Share of immigrant stock living in the United States, by sending region and by decade. Source: Author’s calculations
from IPUMS sample of US Census (Ruggles et al., 2015).
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Figure 3. Total Number of Immigrants (in Thousands)
Note: Annual inflow of immigrants to the United States (1850-1930). Source: Migration Policy Institute.
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Figure 4. Share of European Immigrants in US Cities, 1900
Note: share of individuals of European ancestry living in US cities in 1900, for selected ethnic groups. Source: Author’s
calculations using IPUMS data.
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Figure 5. First Stage: Actual vs Predicted Immigration
Note: the y-axis (resp. x-axis) reports the actual (resp. predicted) number of immigrants over predicted city population in
each of the three Census years, 1910, 1920, and 1930. Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residual change in a
city’s actual and predicted fraction of immigrants after partialling out city and year by state fixed effects. The predicted
number of immigrants is constructed as discussed in Section 4.2 in the text (see (2)). Predicted city population is obtained
by multiplying 1900 city population with average urban growth, excluding that of the Census division where a city is
located. The solid line shows the regression coefficient for the full sample (coefficient=0.999, standard error=0.059). The
dotted (red) line shows the regression coefficient obtained when dropping the city of Passaic, NJ (coefficient=0.940,
standard error=0.068).
Passaic, NJ (1910)
Dashed line drops Passaic (NJ)
Passaic, NJ (1930)
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